Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Corporation, apart from perusing the record.

Though the issue involved in the present writ petition lies in a narrow compass, it arises under peculiar circumstances requiring some consideration. In any event, having heard the respective counsel for the parties, this Court proposes to dispose of the writ petition at the admission stage.

Shorn of extraneous particulars, the facts in brief are that the 1st petitioner’s husband, who was working as a Driver in the respondent Corporation, was initially subjected to certain disciplinary proceedings by the respondent Corporation. The charge is said to be concerning unauthorised absence for five days. Eventually, not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the husband of the 1st petitioner, the disciplinary authority, having held that the charge had been proved, removed him from service through order dated 08.07.2013. Aggrieved thereby, though the 1st petitioner’s husband took recourse to intradepartmental appeal, it was also dismissed on 11.11.2013. Eventually, when the husband of the 1st petitioner filed revision before the 2nd respondent, it was taken up for consideration.

It further emerges from the record that when the 2nd respondent was about to dispose of the said revision application, the husband of the 1st petitioner died on 11.02.2014. Oblivious of the said fact, the 2nd respondent allowed the revision on 13.02.2014 directing the authorities concerned to reinstate the husband of the 1st petitioner into service with a further condition attached thereto that there shall be stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect.

Since the reinstatement could not be given effect to owing to the death of the 1st petitioner’s husband, the 1st petitioner approached the authorities and requested them to treat as if her husband died in service and accordingly settle the terminal benefits and death benefits in her favour. It appears that the respondent authorities have informed the 1st petitioner that in the light of the death of her husband while the order of removal was subsisting, the 1st petitioner is not entitled to any benefits. Under these circumstances, the petitioners approached this Court and filed the present writ petition.

The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the revisional authority has considered the whole issue on merits and decided to set aside the punishment of removal, thereby imposing a modified punishment of stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect. According to the learned counsel, even though the very order was passed just prior to the death of the husband of the 1st petitioner, it came to be signed only subsequently, as has been the practice of the administrative side. As such, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the order is deemed to have been passed when the 1st petitioner’s husband was alive. On the other hand, the learned counsel has contended that passing of an order soon after the death of the employee would not affect its finality, and at best, it is a technical error, which could be corrected. Accordingly, the learned counsel has sought a direction to the authorities to settle the terminal benefits of the deceased employee in favour of the petitioners, treating as if the husband of the 1st petitioner died in harness, on his notional reinstatement.

Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Corporation has strenuously opposed the claims and contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners and has submitted that for all practical purposes, the order dated 13.02.2014 of the revisional authority, having been passed after the death of the delinquent employee i.e., the husband of the 1st petitioner, is a nullity and ipso facto no rights arise out of the same. The learned counsel has also contended that this Court, while exercising its powers under Article