Dr. K.G. Shankar, J.

1. Petition seeks for anticipatory bail on behalf of the petitioners 1 to 4, who are accused 5, 6, 9 and 10 in Crime No. 182 of 2013 on the file of Renigunta Police Station, Chittoor District. The petitioners allegedly committed offences under Sections 498-A, 506, 354-A, 384 and 471 IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. All the offences are triable by a Judicial Magistrate of First Class. Whether the petitioners are entitled to be enlarged on bail or not consequently falls for consideration. Sri C. Masthan Naidu, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the beneficial provision under Section438 Cr.P.C., granting right to the Court to grant anticipatory bail deserves to be saved. The Supreme Court observed in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565, that Section 438 Cr.P.C., was enacted to meet the challenge of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and that since the denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the Court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438 Cr.P.C., more so when such restrictions were not imposed by the Legislature.

2. The learned Counsel for the petitioners referred to Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694. The Supreme Court made certain suggestions which are extracted:

"117. In case, the State considers the following suggestions in proper perspective then perhaps it may not be necessary to curtail the personal liberty of the accused in a routine manner. These suggestions are only illustrative and not exhaustive:

(1) Direct the accused to join the investigation and only when the accused does not co-operate with the investigating agency, then only the accused be arrested.

(2) Seize either the passport or such other related documents, such as, the title deeds of properties or the fixed deposit receipts/share certificates of the accused.

(3) Direct the accused to execute bonds.

(4) The accused may be directed to furnish sureties of a number of persons which according to the prosecution are necessary in view of the facts of the particular case.

(5) The accused be directed to furnish undertaking that he would not visit the place where the witnesses reside so that the possibility of tampering of evidence or otherwise influencing the course of justice can be avoided.

(6) Bank accounts be frozen for small duration during the investigation."

3. In Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260, the Supreme Court considered the power of police to arrest an accused. The Supreme Court cautioned that the arrest should not be merely on suspicion about the complicity of the person in the commission of the crime and that the Police Officer must be satisfied about the necessity and justification of such arrest on the basis of some investigation.

4. The Central Government amended the Code of Criminal Procedure and introduced amendments to Section 41 and introduced Sections 41-A, 41-B and 41-C as well as 41-D with effect from 1.11.2010 restricting the right of police to arrest an accused.

5. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that in the light of these decisions, Section 438 Cr.P.C., shall be exercised with benevolence. I am afraid that benevolence has no place in law, more so in Criminal Law. The question would only be whether the Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 438 Cr.P.C., in a petition of this nature.

6. Where the accused persons allegedly committed offences under provisions which are triable by a Judicial Magistrate of First Class, I would consider that it would be more appropriate for the petitioners to approach the trial Court, surrender before the trial Court and move the trial Court for grant of regular bail rather than approaching the Sessions Court, the High Court or the Supreme Court seeking for grant of anticipatory bail. In a case triable by a Judicial Magistrate of First Class, the entire case record wo