L. Narasimha Reddy, J.

1. This second appeal is filed by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 224 of 2000 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Macherla. The suit was filed against the respondent for the relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale, dated 07.02.1994. The trial Court decreed the suit, through judgment, dated 15.06.2005. Aggrieved by that, the respondent filed A.S. No. 41 of 2005 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Gurajala. The lower Appellate Court allowed the appeal, through judgment, dated 10.08.2008. Hence, this second appeal. The case of the appellant was that the respondent agreed to sell the suit schedule property for a sum of Rs. 80,000/- and on the date of agreement i.e. 07.02.1994, a sum of Rs. 60,000/- was paid. It was stated that the balance of the consideration of Rs. 20,000/- was required to be paid by 06.02.1996 and that the respondent must execute a sale deed. He complained that in spite of repeated demands, the respondent did not receive the balance of consideration and execute the sale deed.

2. The suit was opposed by the respondent by filing the written statement. She pleaded that the agreement of sale was executed only as a measure of security for repayment of Rs. 60,000/-, which was lent to her by the appellant at the exorbitant rate of interest of 30%, per annum. She pleaded that she went on paying a sum of Rs. 1,500/-, per month, for a period of 5 1/2 years and she was unable to continue the payment after the death of her son. The plea of limitation was also raised.

3. As observed earlier, the trial Court decreed the suit, but the lower Appellate Court reversed the decree.

4. Sri K.V. Subba Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the respondent did not dispute the execution of Ex. A.1-agreement of sale, and the trial Court has taken into account all the pleas, including the one of limitation. He contends that the lower Appellate Court has adopted totally hyper-technical and untenable approach in reversing the findings recorded by the trial court. He submits that since the suit was filed soon after the refusal to execute the sale, it cannot be said to be barred by limitation.

5. Sri Challa Srinivasa Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that Ex. A.1 was not at all supposed to be treated as an agreement of sale, and it came to be executed only, as a measure of security. He contends that the very fact that a time gap of two years was provided for the payment of Rs. 20,000/-, itself discloses the objective underlying it. Learned counsel further submits that though a notice dated 14.09.2000 was issued, the claim stood barred by limitation, whether the time is reckoned from the date of agreement or the date on which the balance of consideration was agreed to be paid. He submits that no substantial question of law arises for consideration.

6. The trial Court framed the following points for its consideration:

i) Whether the defendant has borrowed loan amount of Rs. 60,000/- and executed agreement of sale towards security to the loan?

ii) Whether the defendant repaid the sum of Rs. 60,000/- to the plaintiff?

iii) Whether the agreement of sale dated 07,02.1994 is true, valid and intended to be acted upon?

iv) Whether time is essence of the contract and suit is barred by limitation?

v) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of contract?

7. On behalf of the plaintiff, PWs. 1 and 2 were examined and Exs. A.1 to A.3 were filed. The respondent deposed as DW.1 and she filed Exs. B.1 and B.2.

8. The suit was decreed and in A.S. No. 41 of 2005, the lower Appellate Court framed only one point for its consideration:

a) Whether the findings and observations made by the lower Court are contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case?

The appeal was allowed and the decree passed by the trial Court was set aside.

9. The respondent did not dispute the execution of Ex. A.1, the agreement of sale. However, the very recital therein throws an