D.B. Bhosale, Actg. C.J.

1. The question referred to this Full Bench is Whether a petition for a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can be entertained against the order of preventive detention passed under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act (Act 1 of 1986) [for short the Act] or any other enactment authorizing preventive detention?

2. The question was required to be framed in view of the order dated 11th November, 2013, passed by the Division Bench presided over by Mr. Justice Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, the then Chief Justice, in Sare Laxmaih Naidu v. The Collector & District Magistrate, YSR District, Kadapa and others (W.P. No. 32190 of 2013). The order dated 11.11.2013 reads thus:--

"This writ petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to bring fresh action before the appropriate Court ventilating his grievance, as we are of the view that going by the allegations made in this petition and the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties that the petitioner has been detained by the detention order passed by the appropriate authority, no Habeas Corpus writ petition can be entertained. No order as to costs.

(emphasis supplied)

3. This Bench is informed that in view of the order dated 11.11.2013, during last about two years, no writ petitions, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against the order of detention passed by appropriate authority, were filed for a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus and all the writ petitions, challenging such orders, were heard by a single Judge. Our attention was also invited to Rule 14(a) of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, High Court of Andhra Pradesh (for short the Rules), which provides that a petition for a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus is required to be heard by a Bench of two Judges. In this backdrop, learned senior counsel for the petitioners and learned Advocate General, submitted that it is necessary to have an authoritative judicial pronouncement on the question. We make it clear that we have confined ourselves only to the question without entering into merits or recording any findings on merits of the case. Suffice it to say that the order of detention passed under the provisions of the Act against the petitioners is under challenge in the instant Habeas Corpus writ petition.

4. Though, Sri P. Venugopal, the learned Advocate General for the State of Andhra Pradesh, had raised a preliminary objection as to maintainability of the writ petition in the nature of Habeas Corpus in view of the order dated 11.11.2013, he fairly submitted that all throughout, (i.e. prior to the said order) writ petitions, in the nature of Habeas Corpus, challenging the orders of detention passed under the Act or any other law authorizing preventive detention were entertained by a Bench of two judges.

5. Mr. P. Venugopal, the learned Advocate-General for the State of Andhra Pradesh, and Mr. C.V. Mohan Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel for the detenu placed several judgments before this Bench to contend that a petition for a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus only is maintainable against the order of detention passed under the Act. Though the position of law, in our opinion, is well settled, in view of the order dated 11.11.2013 in Sare Laxmaih Naidu (supra), we now proceed to address the question to avoid any such controversy in future.

6. The Supreme Court in Ram Manohar Lohia v. The State of Bihar and another AIR 1966 SC 740 dealt with the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ of Habeas Corpus seeking a direction for the release of Ram Manohar Lohia from detention under an order passed by the District Magistrate of Patna. The order of detention was made under Rule 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. It was contended that the order was not in terms of the Rule under