IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY, J.
Allala Bhagavanth Rao – Petitioner
Versus
Garvandula Vijayalaxmi & Others – Respondent
A.S.M.P. No.1435 of 2012 & Appeal Suit (SR) No. 8071 of 2012
Decided on : 10-06-2015
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Appeal against the decree - Rule 3-A – A.S.M.P. No.1435 of 2012, under Order XLI Rule 3-A read with Section of the Limitation Act is filed to condone delay of days in preferring the Appeal against the decree and judgment passed in Original Suitby the Senior Civil Judge at District on the ground that the petitioner herein has suffered from and viral fever and that his family members were totally immobile thereby could not contact the counsel within time the ground urged by the petitioner is that due to his ill-health, he had incurred lot of expenditure for his medical treatment and due to his inability to meet any further expenditure did not engage the counsel to prefer an Appeal the delay days occurred in preferring the Appeal Learned counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the grounds urged in the petition contended that the sufficient cause must be construed liberally without adopting any pedantic approach and when the petitioner was unable to move from the house due to ill-health it is a sufficient ground to condone the delay and prayed to allow the petition –Held, Concepts such justice oriented approach cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation, especially in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties – Court rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases - Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section of the Limitation Act the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers - All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law - Discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason - Whims or fancies prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. – Appeal Suit stands rejected.
A.S.M.P. No.1435 of 2012, under Order XLI Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘the C.P.C.’) read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘the Act’) is filed to condone delay of 168 days in preferring the Appeal against the decree and judgment dated 13.09.2011 passed in Original Suit No.13 of 2006 by the Senior Civil Judge at Jagtial, Karimnagar District, on the 1st ground that the petitioner herein has suffered from Chikungunya and viral fever and that his family members were totally immobile, thereby could not contact the counsel within time; the 2nd ground urged by the petitioner is that due to his ill-health, he had incurred lot of expenditure for his medical treatment and due to his inability to meet any further expenditure did not engage the counsel to prefer an Appeal. Hence, the delay of 168 days occurred in preferring the Appeal.
Learned counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the grounds urged in the petition contended that the sufficient cause must be construed liberally without adopting any pedantic approach and when the petitioner was unable to move from the house due to ill-health it is a sufficient ground to condone the delay and prayed to allow the petition.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the cause shown by the petitioner is not sufficient cause, as he failed to explain each and every days delay and even did not furnish the details of commencement of sickness and recovery and prayed to dismiss the petition.
Considering rival contentions and perusing the material available on record, the sole point that arises for consideration is:
Whether the petitioner was prevented by a cause, which is beyond his reasonable control? If so, the delay of 168 days, in preferring the Appeal, be condoned?
POINT: The first and foremost ground urged for condonation of delay, in Para 7 of the affidavit, is that the petitioner suffered from Chikungunya and viral fever and unable to move from the house; therefore, he could not contact his counsel. But, nowhere in the affidavit, the dates of commencement of his sickness and recovery disclosed. Except making a bald allegation, no medical certificate was produced to substantiate his contention that he had suffered from Chikungunya or viral fever for a prolonged period of 168 days. In the absence of any details of his sickness, more particularly, the dates and medical certificate from the competent doctor, I am unable to accept the contention that there is sufficient cause to condone the delay.
The 2nd ground urged for condonation of delay is that the petitioner had no means to engage counsel to prefer an Appeal, as he had already incurred huge amount for medical treatment.
Lack of funds to file an appeal engaging the counsel is not a ground to condone the delay as held by the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Mahant Gurmukh Singh Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, wherein it was held as follows:
“Mere non-availability of funds for obtaining the requisite certified copy is, in our opinion, no ground for the extension of time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”
In the facts of the above judgment, the Appeal could not be filed as the petitioner therein was unable to spend Rs.200/- for obtaining certified copies and thereby caused delay in preferring an Appeal but the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court did not accept the cause shown by the petitioner for condonation of delay and dismissed the petition.
In another judgment of the Apex Court in Banarsi Das and Others Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, it was held as follows in Para 6:
“This petition was not filed within the time limited by the rules of this Court and on their own showing there was a delay of 44 days in filing the petition for special leave. The only ground urged in support of the application for condonation of delay (being Civil Miscellaneous Petition No.1402 of 1955) is that they had to collect money from amongst a lar
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