JUDGMENT :

B. PRAKASH RAO, J.:— Heard Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri A. Venkata Ramana, the learned Counsel who has been appointed to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae, since none appears on behalf of the respondents, though served.

2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the appellant is the unsuccessful plaintiff who, by way of this appeal, seeks to assail the judgment and decree dated 31-12-2001 in O.S. No. 15 of 2000 on the file of the District Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam. In the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff, she sought a declaration that she alone is entitled to plaint ‘A’ to ‘D’ schedule movable and immovable properties as per the last Will dated 12-3-2000 executed by the testator and for possession of properties from the hands of defendants and for future profits over the schedule properties and costs or alternatively for partition of the schedule properties into two shares and deliver one share to the plaintiff. The case of the plaintiff principally rests on the basis that the second defendant is her brother. The first defendant is the wife of the deceased M. Narasimha Rao. The plaintiff claims to have been adopted in the year 1984, which has been subsequently evidenced by a Deed of Adoption-Ex. A1 dated 10-9-1996. Whereas the second defendant claims that he was adopted in the year 1975. However, according to the plaintiff, the said adoption was cancelled by a Deed-Ex. A8 dated 9-3-1992. The plaintiff also claims the suit properties alternatively in pursuance of bequeath under the Will-Ex. A3 dated 12-3-2000 alleged to have executed by the deceased M. Narasimha Rao. Similarly, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 also claim the suit properties in pursuance of bequeath under a Will-Ex. B1 dated 26-10-1999 executed by the said M. Narasimha Rao. The case of the plaintiff was that the second defendant is a wayward and therefore, the adoption was cancelled. She has been adopted rightly and therefore, entitled to the property as the adopted daughter or alternatively, as stated above, in pursuance of the Will dated 12-3-2000. Hence, the suit.

3. Contesting the claim of the plaintiff, the defendant denied entire allegations and asserted that the second defendant is the adopted son validly made in the year 1975 and even otherwise, in pursuance of the Will dated 26-10-1999 executed by the deceased, they are exclusively entitled to the schedule properties. Therefore, the plaintiff has no title or interest whatsoever of the nature and hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed.

4. With these and other contentions in respect of the pleadings, the Court below framed the following issues:

1. Whether the Will dated 12-3-2000 is true and valid?

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration of title and recovery of possession over the plaint schedule property?

3. Whether the Will dated 26-10-1999 propounded by the first defendant is true and valid?

4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to alternative relief as prayed for?

5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to future profits? and

6. To what relief?

5. Thereafter, both the sides went into trial. On behalf of the plaintiff, P.Ws. 1 to 7 were examined and Exs. A1 to A10 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and Ex. B1 was marked, apart from Exs. X1 to X7. Considering the evidence and material on record, the trial Court dismissed the suit upholding the claim of defendant Nos. 1 and 2. Hence, the appeal.

6. Having heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and the Amicus Curiae and on perusal of the material available on record, the question that arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff has any right, title or interest whatsoever in nature in respect of the suit schedule properties either in pursuance of adoption or under the Will. Similarly, the same is the staring question as to the right or title as held by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of the adoption as claimed by the second defendant or in pursu