The court held that there is no absolute bar on granting bail under Section 43-D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and that the court has the discretion to grant bail even in cases where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true.

JUDGMENT :

Akula Venkata Sesha Sai, J.

1. Accused No. 84 in S.C. No. 119 of 2019 on the file of the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge for trial of N.I.A. Act Cases at Vijayawada is the appellant in the present Criminal Appeal, preferred under Section 21 (4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008.

2. Heard Sri D. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, and Sri Siddi Ramulu, learned Senior Public Prosecutor for the National Investigation Agency, apart from perusing the entire material available on record.

3. In an incident that took place at 12.10 p.m. on 23.09.2018 two representatives of the people were alleged to have been killed by the Maoists. In connection with the said offence, Dumbriguda Police registered Cr. No. 65 of 2018 on 23.09.2018 against 45 persons initially. Subsequently, the case was taken up by the National Investigation Agency and, during the investigation, some more persons were added as accused and re-registered the same as Rc. No. 2/2018/NIA/Hyd, under Sections 120-B, 147, 148, 149, 302, 342, 353 and 397 IPC, Sections 25 and 27 of the Indian Arms Act and Sections 16, 18 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Thereafter, after completion of investigation, the National Investigation Agency filed charge sheet and also supplemental charge sheet. On the basis of the confession statement of A46-Sri Yedala Subba Rao, appellant herein came to be added as A84 and ever since he has been in Central Prison, Visakhapatnam. Appellant herein filed Crl.M.P. No. 1831 of 2019 on the file of the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge for trial of N.I.A. Act Cases at Vijayawada, under Sections 437 and 439 of Cr.P.C., seeking his enlargement on bail. The prosecution resisted the said application by filing a counter. The learned Judge, by way of an order, dated 23.12.2019, dismissed the said application. In the present Criminal Appeal, filed under Section 21 (4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, challenge is to the said order passed by the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge for trial of N.I.A. Act Cases at Vijayawada.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant herein contends that the order passed by the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge for trial of N.I.A. Act Cases at Vijayawada is highly erroneous and contrary to law, besides being opposed to the very spirit and object of the provisions of the National Investigation Agency Act and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. It is further contended that, in the absence of any material on record, which prima facie shows the involvement of the appellant herein in the crime, the learned Judge grossly erred in dismissing the application; that the proviso to Section 43-D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Protection) Act does not impose any absolute prohibition on the discretion of the Court to consider and grant bail; that the reasons assigned by the learned Judge, for dismissing the application, are neither sustainable nor tenable in the eye of law. In support of his submissions and contentions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the following judgments:

1. State of Kerala v. Raneef [(2011) 1 SCC 784].

2. The order, dated 21.12.2012, in Crl.A. No. 824 of 2012, passed by the composite High Court.

5. On the contrary, totally supporting the impugned order and opposing the application for bail, filed by the appellant herein, it is contended by the learned Senior Public Prosecutor that there is no error nor there exists any infirmity in the impugned order and that the appellant herein is not entitled for bail in view of the existence of prima facie case against the appellant herein and in view of the mandate of law as provided under proviso to Section 43-D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act; that, having regard to the nature of accusations against the appellant here