The main legal point established in the judgment is the entitlement of a party to seek the appointment of a Court Receiver when the opposing party fails to comply with previous orders to deposit rents into the Court's account.

JUDGMENT:

The present Appeal is preferred by the appellant aggrieved by the order dated 31.01.2023 passed in I.A.No.468 of 2022 in O.S No.83 of 2018 on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Nellore, SPSR Nellore District (for short “the trial Court”).

2. The impugned application has been filed by the appellant/petitioner before the trial Court under Order 40 Rule 1(D) CPC to appoint a Court Receiver for collecting monthly rental amounts from plaint schedule A and B shops and house properties which are in possession of respondents no.9 to 13 and 15 to 19 and further directing him to deposit the rental amount into the CCD account and manage, protect and improve the properties on subsequent changes if any. The same was dismissed by the trial Court vide order dated 31.01.2023 on the ground that the trial in the Suit was already commenced, and if the petitioner succeeds in the suit, she can as well sought for mesne profits. Challenging the same, the present civil miscellaneous appeal came to be filed.

3. Heard Sri Sivaprasad Reddy V., learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri M. Gowtham, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

4. During hearing, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the order of the trial Court judge is contrary to law and vitiated by material irregularities and jurisdictional errors and liable to be set aside. He submits that the trial Court erred in dismissing the I.A. filed by the appellant/ petitioner to appoint an advocate Court receiver to collect monthly rental amounts from sources mentioned in schedule A and Schedule B shops and houses of petition schedule properties, which are occupied by the respondents 9 to 13 and 15 to 19 and manage, protect, improve the properties on subsequent changes, if any and deposits the rents amount before the Court CCD account. He further submits that the court below ought to have appreciated that the respondents have not filed counter without filing any counter simply representing that they vacate the shops is not acceptable further facts need to determine for the purpose of adjudication was not answered by the trial Court and that the prayer of the petitioner is not only for deposit of rents, but the petitioner has sought for elaborate prayer, the same was not discussed in the order. Therefore, learned counsel requests this Court to pass appropriate orders by setting aside the impugned order.

5. To support his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgments of the High Court of Judicature, Hyderabad reported in Kallam Mangamma vs. K.Brahma Reddy, 1989(1)ALT 331 (SB) and in a case of Chundru Srinivasa Rao vs. Cundru Venkata Rao, 1992(2) ALT 733 (SB), wherein it was rightly concluded and directed the defendants to deposit the amount and also directed the lower Court to appoint a receiver.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the trial Court has rightly concluded and dismissed the application filed by the appellant/petitioner. He opposed for allowing the appeal. He placed reliance on a judgment of High Court of Punjab reported in Ved Parkash and Ors. Vs Tara Chand and Ors., MANU/PH/0061/954, wherein it was held that, “….In Mulla’s Civil Procedure Code at p.1170 it is stated that the Court will not, as a general rule, appoint a receiver in suits between members of a joint family, especially where the family property consists of immovable property, put a receiver may be appointed in a suit for partition where there is a prima facie case of misappropriation by the manager of the family. This is the rule which governs generally appointment of receivers in disputes between the members of joint Hindu families. It was further held that there was nothing on which the learned judge could have based a finding in favour of there being a wastage or misappropriation. No case had been made out for the appointment of a receiver and hence dismissed the appeal.”

7. On perusing the impugned order, this Cour