1. Appeal against dismissal of temporary injunction applications in a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of land. (Para 2 , 3 , 4 )
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2025 Supreme(AP) 1436
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
RAVI NATH TILHARI, MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM, JJ.
Manigiri Ramesh Babu S/o. Eswaraiah - Appellant
Vs.
Gajula Venugopal S/o. Eswaraiah - Respondent
Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 714 Of 2025
Decided On : 17-12-2025
Important Points
For the grant of a temporary injunction, a plaintiff must prove a prima facie case, balance of convenience in their favour, and the likelihood of irreparable injury if the injunction is refused.
Subject
Civil Law - Injunctions
Act Referred
Headnote
(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 and Order XLIII Rule 1 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 52 - Grant of temporary injunction - The three essential ingredients for granting a temporary injunction are the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience in favor of the applicant, and the likelihood of irreparable loss or injury if the injunction is refused (Paras 33, 36, 63) - The jurisdiction of an appellate court under Order XLIII Rule 1 is limited; it shall not interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion unless such discretion is shown to be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or perversely, or where the court has ignored settled principles of law or relevant facts (Paras 34, 35, 43) - An order is considered perverse if it is against the weight of evidence, deviates from what is right and reasonable, or ignores material evidence on record (Paras 41, 52).
(B) Administrative building permits issued by civil authorities do not determine or confer legal title over the property in dispute, as matters relating to the declaration of rights and ownership are exclusively determinable by competent civil courts (Para 64).
(C) Distinction between Section 52 of the T.P. Act and Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the CPC: An order of temporary injunction is preemptive in nature to restrain the act of alienation, whereas Section 52 of the T.P. Act governs the consequences of a transfer that has already taken place pending litigation (Para 66).
(D) A defendant's undertaking to demolish constructions if the plaintiff succeeds in a suit does not automatically justify the refusal of a temporary injunction, particularly when the defendant is actively creating third-party interests by alienating the subject land during the pendency of the suit (Paras 61, 62).
Facts of the case:
The appellant filed a suit for declaration of right and title and recovery of possession of a specific extent of land, along with applications for temporary injunctions to restrain the respondents from alienating the property and continuing constructions. The trial court dismissed the applications, relying on oral submissions that the appellant's registered documents were fabricated and noting the respondents' undertaking to demolish any constructions if the appellant eventually succeeded. The appellant's registered chain of documents specifically identified the survey number and extent of the land, while the respondents' documents lacked specific details regarding the extent of the disputed plot.
Findings of Court:
The trial court's rejection of the injunction based on oral pleas of fabrication at a pre-trial stage was legally unsustainable and amounted to pre-judging the issue. The court found that the appellant's registered documents established a prima facie case, while the respondents' documents were ambiguous. Furthermore, the respondents' execution of sale deeds and development agreements in favor of third parties during the litigation created a risk of multiplicity of proceedings and irreparable injury.
Issues: Whether the trial court's orders refusing interim injunctions were sustainable or suffered from perversity due to the misappreciation of registered evidence and reliance on oral submissions over documentary proof.
Ratio Decidendi: Appellate intervention is necessary when a trial court's discretionary order is perverse, meaning it overlooks essential evidence or applies incorrect legal standards. In the present case, the trial court ignored the specificity of the appellant's registered deeds and the ambiguity of the respondents'. The balance of convenience tilted in favor of the appellant because the respondents' act of creating third-party interests rendered a mere undertaking to demolish insufficient to preserve the subject matter of the suit.
Result: Appeals allowed; interim injunction granted restraining the respondents from alienating the subject land and proceeding with constructions until disposal of the main suit.
(B) Administrative building permits issued by civil authorities do not determine or confer legal title over the property in dispute, as matters relating to the declaration of rights and ownership are exclusively determinable by competent civil courts (Para 64).
(C) Distinction between Section 52 of the T.P. Act and Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the CPC: An order of temporary injunction is preemptive in nature to restrain the act of alienation, whereas Section 52 of the T.P. Act governs the consequences of a transfer that has already taken place pending litigation (Para 66).
(D) A defendant's undertaking to demolish constructions if the plaintiff succeeds in a suit does not automatically justify the refusal of a temporary injunction, particularly when the defendant is actively creating third-party interests by alienating the subject land during the pendency of the suit (Paras 61, 62).
Facts of the case:
The appellant filed a suit for declaration of right and title and recovery of possession of a specific extent of land, along with applications for temporary injunctions to restrain the respondents from alienating the property and continuing constructions. The trial court dismissed the applications, relying on oral submissions that the appellant's registered documents were fabricated and noting the respondents' undertaking to demolish any constructions if the appellant eventually succeeded. The appellant's registered chain of documents specifically identified the survey number and extent of the land, while the respondents' documents lacked specific details regarding the extent of the disputed plot.
Findings of Court:
The trial court's rejection of the injunction based on oral pleas of fabrication at a pre-trial stage was legally unsustainable and amounted to pre-judging the issue. The court found that the appellant's registered documents established a prima facie case, while the respondents' documents were ambiguous. Furthermore, the respondents' execution of sale deeds and development agreements in favor of third parties during the litigation created a risk of multiplicity of proceedings and irreparable injury.
Issues: Whether the trial court's orders refusing interim injunctions were sustainable or suffered from perversity due to the misappreciation of registered evidence and reliance on oral submissions over documentary proof.
Ratio Decidendi: Appellate intervention is necessary when a trial court's discretionary order is perverse, meaning it overlooks essential evidence or applies incorrect legal standards. In the present case, the trial court ignored the specificity of the appellant's registered deeds and the ambiguity of the respondents'. The balance of convenience tilted in favor of the appellant because the respondents' act of creating third-party interests rendered a mere undertaking to demolish insufficient to preserve the subject matter of the suit.
Result: Appeals allowed; interim injunction granted restraining the respondents from alienating the subject land and proceeding with constructions until disposal of the main suit.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : S Lakshminarayana Reddy
For the Respondent: Mallidi Aruna Sri Satya
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : S Lakshminarayana Reddy
For the Respondent: Mallidi Aruna Sri Satya
Table of Contents
2. Plaintiff claimed prima facie title through registered documents; defendants disputed title and possession, arguing trial court's discretion was sound. (Para 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 )
3. Appeals allowed; trial court's orders set aside; interim injunction granted restraining alienation and construction pending suit. (Para 70 , 71 )
4. What are the three essential conditions for grant of temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC?
The plaintiff must prove a prima facie case, balance of convenience in its favour, and likelihood of irreparable injury if injunction is refused. (Para 32 , 33 , 36 , 39 , 66 )
5. When can an appellate court interfere with a trial court's discretionary order refusing a temporary injunction?
An appellate court may interfere if the trial court's order is perverse, arbitrary, capricious, or ignores settled principles of law, but not merely because a different view is possible. (Para 34 , 35 , 37 , 38 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 65 )
6. Does the omission of the extent of land in a registered document affect the claim of title over that land?
If the documents relied upon by the defendants do not specify the extent of land in the relevant survey number, they cannot establish title over that specific land, and ignoring this amounts to perversity. (Para 48 , 51 , 52 , 54 )
7. Is an undertaking by the defendant to demolish constructions if the plaintiff succeeds sufficient to deny a temporary injunction?
No, a mere undertaking does not adequately protect the plaintiff's interests, especially when the defendant has already alienated the property to third parties. (Para 61 , 62 )
8. Does Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act alone protect the plaintiff's interests during pendency of a suit?
No, Section 52 TPA alone is insufficient; the court may grant an injunction under Order 39 CPC to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and ensure the decree is not rendered illusory. (Para 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 67 )
JUDGMENT:
(per Justice Maheswara Rao Kuncheam)
Heard Sri S. Lakshminarayana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and Sri V.V. Ravi Prasad, learned counsel representing Ms.Malladi Aruna, learned counsel for the respondents/respondents. Perused the entire material available on record.
2. The plaintiff filed O.S. No.27 of 2025 on the file of the Court of III Addl. District Judge, Kurnool at Nandyal, for declaration of right and title of the plaintiff and recovery of possession of the land to an extent of Ac.0.03 cents/500 links (169.59 Sq. yards) in Sy. No.663/5 of Moolasagaram Village, Nandyal Mandal and District (Erstwhile Kurnool District) (hereinafter called as ‘subject land’) from respondent Nos.3 and 4 and also for consequential permanent injunction retraining the respondents from interfering with possession over the subject land and to declare the document Nos.9361 & 9362 of 2024 dated 22.06.2024 executed by the respondent Nos.1 & 2 in favour of respondent No.3 represented by the respondent No.4 as null and void and also for mandatory injunction to demolish the constructions made in the ABCD portion and also for restraining the respondents from alienating the subject land.
3. Along with the suit, the plaintiff filed I.A. No.1634 of 2025 seeking temporary injunction restraining the respondents from alienating or creating any sort of encumbrances over the subject land by way of sale, gift, lease or mortgage entering into an agreement of sale till the disposal of the main suit to others under Order XXXIX Rule 1 R/w. Section 151 C.P.C., in O.S.No.27 of 2025. The said I.A. was dismissed on merits and aggrieved by the Order of dismissal dated 20.08.2025, the plaintiff filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.714 of 2025 before this Court by invoking Order XLIII Rule 1 C.P.C.
4. The plaintiff also filed I.A. No.1635 of 2025 seeking temporary injunction restraining the respondents from making further constructions in the subject land under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 r/w. Section 151 C.P.C., in O.S.No.27 of 2025. The said I.A. was also dismissed on merits and aggrieved by the Order of dismissal dated 20.08.2025, the plaintiff filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.686 of 2025 before this Court by invoking Order XLIII Rule 1 C.P.C.
5. In view of common submissions advanced by the respective counsel on both sides, coupled with the nexus between the respective cases, we deem it appropriate to pass common orders.
Case of the appellant/plaintiff:
6. It is the version of the plaintiff that he is working as Junior Commissioning Officer in the Indian Army at Pune, Maharashtra State. Originally, the subject land was sold to Z. William Stanley by Shakun @ Shekun Bee and Shaikmabusagari Rajia Begum @ Rajiabee through registered sale deed vide document No.6269/2014 dated 22.10.2014(Ex.P.2). Z. William Stanley executed a registered sale deed vide document No.2780/2018 dated 19.03.2018 in favour of Shaik Hussain Ali (Ex.P.3) and he in turn sold the subject land to Mulla Khader Hussain by way of registered sale deed vide document No.2472/2019 dated 02.03.2019 (Ex.P.4). Later, Mulla Khader Hussain sold the subject land to one Manigiri Pedda Eswaraiah, who is the father of the plaintiff by way of registered sale deed vide document No.8489/2020 dated 25.09.2020 (Ex.P.5). At last, the subject land was handed over to the plaintiff by his father through registered gift deed document bearing No.12580/2023 dated 15.11.2023 (Ex.P.6) and the plaintiff became the absolute owner and possessor of the subject land.
7. While that being the position, respondent Nos.1 and 2 with an intention to grab the plaintiff’s property by creating fake documents in their father’s name Gajula Eswaraiah, acquired properties in Sy.No.662/2 to an extent of Ac.0.22 cents in Sy.No.663/6 to an extent of Ac.0.05 cents in Sy.No.662/1 an extent of Ac.0.30 cents and in Sy.No.663/5 of Mulasagaram Village, Nandyal Mandal and District by way of registered documents and in
