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1975 Supreme(Kar) 58
Karnataka High Court
J.MANDANLAL - Appellant
Versus
V.NARAYANASWAMY - Respondent
Decided On : 06-09-75
C.P. : 237 of 1974
A.T.SRIRANGAIALI, B.G.SRIDHARAN
Courts have the power to review their decisions under the Karnataka Rent Control Act based on ordinary rules of practice and procedure, even in the absence of an express provision for review.
Headnote:
Review - Karnataka Rent Control Act - The court held that even in the absence of an express provision in the Act conferring the power of review, the Court, the District Judge, and the High Court have the power to review their decisions based on the ordinary rules of practice and procedure.
Fact of the Case:
The landlord sought eviction of the tenant from the premises for his own occupation. The court made a decree for eviction from the residential portion but refused eviction from the non-residential portion. The landlord petitioned for review or modification of the order to construct a wall for access to the residential portion.
Finding of the Court:
The court overruled the preliminary objection that an order made under the Act cannot be reviewed, citing the power of review based on ordinary rules of practice and procedure.
Issues: The issue was whether the court had the power to review its decision under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, which did not contain an express provision for review.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that even in the absence of an express provision in the Act conferring the power of review, the Court, the District Judge, and the High Court have the power to review their decisions based on the ordinary rules of practice and procedure.
Final Decision: The court allowed the review and overruled the preliminary objection, affirming its power to review its decision under the Act.
( 2 ) THE landlord had made an application under S. 21 of the Act for eviction of the tenant from the petition premises on the ground that he required the premises for his (the landlord's) own occupation. The front portion of the petition premises was being used by the tenant for carrying on his business and he was residing in the rear portion of the premises. In the revision petition I made a decree for eviction of the tenant from the residential portion and refused eviction from the non residential portion of the premises.
( 3 ) IN this petition, the landlord has praved for reviewing and setting aside my order in the revision petition. Alternatively, he has prayed that the order in the revision petition be modified so as tc permit him (the landlord) to construct a wall of 9" thickness running through the non-residential portion of the premises so as to provide a passage of 3 feet width to give access to the residential portion of the premises from the main road.
( 4 ) MR. M. Srirangaiah, learned Counsel for the tenant, raised a preliminary objection that an order made under the Act cannot be reviewed as there is no express provision in the Act providing for review of an order thereunder.
( 5 ) IT is true that the Act does not contain any express provision empowering the Court as defined in S. 3 (d) of the Act, or the Dist Judge or this Court tc review an order under the Act. The question is whether in the absence of such an express provision the Courts can exercise power of review in a matter arising under the Act.
( 6 ) IN National Sewing Thread Co Ltd v. James Chadwich and Bros, AIR. 1953 SC 357. the Supreme Court considered the question whether from the decision of a single Judge of the High Court in an appeal arising under the Trade marks Act, 1940, a Letters Patent appeal would lie to the Division Bench of that Court. The Trade Marks Act did not provide for such further appeal. The Supreme Court observed that after an appeal had reached the High Court, the future conduct or career of that appeal has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance with the provisions of the Charter under which that Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. Their Lordships held that the letters Patent appeal was competent even though Trade Marks Act did not expressly provide for such appeal. Their Lordships quoted with approval the following observations of the Judicial Committee of Privy Council in Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar, AIR. 1948 PC. 12. :" Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not, in terms confer a right of appeal. "
( 7 ) IN the light of the above pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the Privy Council, ordinary Courts which have been seized of a dispute in respect of a legal right or liability under a special enactment, should be regarded as having power to adjudicate such dispute according to the ordinary rules of practice and procedure which would include, the power to review judgments and orders. Even in the absence of an express provision in the Act conferring the power of review, the Court as defined in s. 3 (d) of the Act, the Dist Judge and this Court, have in my opinion, power to review it
