( 1 ) THE petitioner is a religious institution. It has questioned the validity of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1973 (Act 1 of 1. 974) by which the State Legislature amended many of the provisions of the karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (Act 10 of 1962 ). The constitutional validity of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, was upheld by the supreme Court in Golaknath v. State of Punjab AIR. 1967 SC. 1643. In Shankar Krishaji v. State of Karnataka AIR. 1975 Kar. 55= (1974) 2 Karlj. 509. I have upheld the validity of the Karnataka Act 1 of 1974 being of the opinion that it is protected by Art. 31a of the Constn. The validity of S. 48 and 48a relating to the constitution of the Tribunals and the procedure to be followed before the Tribunals under the Karnataka land Reforms Act has been specifically upheld in Khatija Bi v. State of Karnataka ILR. 1975 Kar. 1481 = (1975) 2 Karlj, 157.

( 2 ) IT is however contended by Sri T. Krishna Rao learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the Amending Act (Act 1 of 1974) which affected the right of the religious institutions to hold property is violative of Art. 26 of the constn. The provisions of the Act are not open to attack on the above ground for two reasons: (i) Act 1 of 1974 has been included in the Ninth schedule to the constn by the Constn (Thirty fourth Amendment) Act, 1974; and (ii) the right guaranted under Art. 26 of the Constn is not an absolute right. In Acharya Maharaj Sri v. State of Gujarat 4v AIR. 1974 SC 2098. dealing with Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act, the Supreme Courr has observed as follows : when we look at the object of the Act and of the various provisions enacted in furtherance of agrarian reforms, the Act is squarely protected under the saving provision of Art. 31a. But it is then submitted that Art. 31 A does not provide against the vice of contravention of Art. 26 while Arts. 14, 19 and 31 are expressly mentioned in art. 31 A. The question, therefore, arises whether the right under art. 26 (c) is an absolute and unqualified right to the extent that no agrarian reform can touch upon the lands owned by the religious denominations. No rights in an organised society can be absolute. Enjoyment of one's rights must be consistent with an enjoyment of rights also by others. Where in a free play of social forrces it is not possible to bring about a voluntary harmony, the State has to step in to set right the imbalance between competing interests and there the directive Principles of State Policy, although not enforceable in courts, have a definite and positive role introducing an obligation upon the State under Art. 37 in making laws to regulate the conduct of men and their affairs. In doing so a distinction will have to be made between those laws which directly infringe the freedom of religion and others, although indirectly affecting some secular activities of religious institutions or bodies. For example if a religious institution owns large areag of land for exceeding the ceiling under relevant laws and indulges in activities detrimental to the interests of the agricultural tenants, who are at their mercy, freedom of religion or freedom to manage religious affairs cannot be pleaded as a shield against regulatory remedial measures adopted by the State to put a stop to exploitation and unrest in other quarters in the interest of general social welfare. The core of religion is not interfered with in providing for amenities for sufferers of any kind. We take the view that the Act and its provisions do no violence to the rights guaranteed under Art. 26 (c ). In the view we have taken it is also not necessary to mention Art. 26 in Art. 31a and its omission therein is not at all of any consequence.

( 3 ) IN the instance case it is not shown that owning of agricultural land by a Mutt form on essential tenet of Hindu religion. Since Act 1 of 1974 has been held to be protected by Art. 31a of the Constn, it cannot be Said that it is violative of Art. 26 (c)

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