1977 Supreme(Kar) 110
Karnataka High Court
MANJU RAMAKRISHNA NAIK - Appellant
Versus
UMESH SHRIDAR - Respondent
Decided On : 04-15-77
R.S.A. : 1082 of 1972
K.I.BHATTA, T.S.RAMACHANDRAN
The Court's decision emphasized the importance of jurisdiction in decreeing suits based on rent control acts and applied principles from previous case law to determine the jurisdictional issue.
Headnote:
Sec. 100 CPC - Appeal against decree in RA. No. 139 of 1970 - Mysore (Now Karnataka) Rent Control Act, 1961, Ss. 19 to 31 - Court upheld appellant's contention based on S. 21(1) of the Act - Comparison with S. 12(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rent Control Act, 1947 - Applicability of principles from Shah Bhojraj's case (AIR. 1961 SC. 1596) - Court held that the Courts below had no jurisdiction to decree the suit in question.
Fact of the Case:
The landlord filed a suit seeking possession of the shop premises and arrears of rent from the tenant. The tenant raised a contention based on the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, which was extended after the suit was filed. Both lower courts decreed the suit, but the appellant appealed, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction to decree the suit based on the Act.
Finding of the Court:
The Court upheld the appellant's contention, stating that the Courts below had no jurisdiction to decree the suit in question.
Issues: Jurisdiction of the Court to decree the suit based on the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, after its extension to the area where the premises was situated.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court compared the provisions of S. 21(1) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, with S. 12(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rent Control Act, 1947, and applied the principles from Shah Bhojraj's case (AIR. 1961 SC. 1596) to hold that the Courts below had no jurisdiction to decree the suit in question.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, the decrees of both Courts below were set aside, and the suit was dismissed. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
( 1 ) THIS is a defendant's second appeal under Sec. 100 CPC and directed against the decree in RA. No. 139 of 1970 on the file of the Civil Judge, karwar, dismissing the appeal of the appellant and affirming the decree in OS. No. 397 of 1962 on the file of the Additional Munsiff, Honavar.
( 2 ) BRIEFLY, the facts so far as they are material for the disposal of the only contention urged in support of the appeal, are : the resplendent-landlord instituted the suit on 5-11-1962 seeking a decree for possession of the suit shop premises, arrears of rent and mesne profits, principally on the ground that the appellant-tenant had defaulted in payment of arrears of rent due for the period 22-2-1962 to 1-11-1962. At the time of institution of the suit, parts IV and V of the Mysore (Now karnataka) Rent Control Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Act, comprising Ss. 19 to 31, regulating payment of rents by tenants and their eviction, had not been extended and made applicable to Honavar town which is concerned herewith. The said provisions, however, were made applicable to the area for the first time with effect from 1-6-1963, when the suit was still pending in the Court of first instance. Taking advantage of the change in the law, the appellant raised a contention substantially to the effect that the suit would not be maintainable in the face of the express prohibition enacted in sub-sec (1) of s. 21 of the Act.
( 3 ) BOTH the Courts below negatived the contention and decreed the suit for possession and mesne profits only, the claim regarding arrears of rent not having survived for consideration for one reason or another. The first appellate Court, in negativing the said contention, however, depended almost exclusively on a ruling of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ibrahim v. Mandepanda Cariappa ( (1971) 1 Myslj. 453 ).
( 4 ) ON behalf of the appellant, the very same contention has been reiterated, but in a slightly modified form, placing reliance on an enunciation by the Supreme Court in the case of Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Milis and Ginning Factory v. Subashchandra Yogaraj Sinha (AIR. 1961 SC. 1596 ). Briefly, the contention formulated may be stated thus: Having regard to the prohibition enacted in the main clause of sub-sec (1) of S. 21 of the Act, the Court would not be competent to make a decree for recovery of possession of the premises governed by the provisions of the Act except in the manner and in accordance with the conditions specified in the proviso therein. Since the bar enacted therein affects the very power of the Court to make a decree or order for recovery of possession by the landlord, the Court was bound to have taken notice of the same at the time it was called upon to make the decree and dismissed the suit. On behalf of the respondent, this contention was sought to be repelled by placing reliance almost exclusively on the decision in Ibrahim's case (1) (Supra ). Upon a careful examination of the authorities cited, we are clearly of the view that the contention of the appellant is well-founded and must be upheld.
( 5 ) IN the case of Ibrahim v. Mandepanda Cariappa (1), the facts were substantially similar to those present in the case on hand. After suits were filed by landlords against tenants for decrees for recovery of possession of the premises concerned therewith and arrears of rent, Parts IV and V of the Act were extended in their application to the area in point. By applopriate amendments of the written statements, pleas were raised which gave rise to an issue 'whether the Court has no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit for reasons stated in par a-10 of the written statement'. The issue was explained by the Bench thus :" Apparently what the Court meant by framing the above issue was whether the Court had on the coming into force of Parts IV and v of the Act jurisdiction to continue to try the suits which had already been instituted. In fact no question of territorial ju