( 1 ) THE suit lands concerned in this! second appeal were admittedly 'devasthan Inam Lands'. They were leased to the husband of the appellant and after his death, the appellant has been continuing in possession on an annual rental of Rs. 111-14p. These were the averments made by the respondent-plaintiffs in the suit for possession against the appellant- defendant.

( 2 ) THE trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the defendant was a tenant under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands; act and her'tenancy rights were not affected notwithstanding the provisions in the then existing Sec. 107 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. But that decree was reversed in the appeal on the ground that the suit lands fell within the scope of Sec. 107 and consequently, the defendant has ho protection from eviction

( 3 ) IT seems to me that it is not necessary to consider the correctness of the divergent views expressed by the Courts below. Sec. 107 has been substantially amended by Karnataka Act 1 of 1974, whereby the exemption that was available to Religious and Charitable Institutions managed by or under the control of the State Govt has been altogethar taken away. The tenant of even such lands is now entitled to protection and benefits conferred by the Land Reforms Act. See Mahalingaswamigalu v. State of Karnataka ( (1977) 1 Karlj. 409. ).

( 4 ) BUT, Mr. K. S. Savanur, learned Counsel for the respondents, contended that Karnataka Act 1 of 1974 was applicable only to the original proceedings pending in the Munsiff's Court and it did not govern the pending appeals, including this second appeal. In support of his submisision, he relied upon Ser. 91 (1) by which Karnataka Act 1 of 1974 was made applicable to all the proceedings commenced before the date of commencement of the Act and pending before any Court, Tribunal or any other authority. He also relied upon the decision of this Court in Re: court Fee (1961 Myslj. 496. ). In the aforesaid case, the scope of sub-sec (3) of Sec. 79 of the Karnataka court Fees and Suits Valuation Act came up for consideration sub-sec (3) of Sec. 79 provides:" All suits and proceedings instituted before the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding the repeal of the Acts specified in sub-section (1) be governed by the provisions of the said Acts and the rules made thereunder. "construing the scope of the words 'suit', 'proceedings' and 'institute' mentioned in the aforesaid sub-section, this Court held that the 'proceedings' in that context, could not include the 'appeal proceedings' because, in he legal concept, the term 'institute' is used with reference to the very first proceedings with which a party approaches the Court and, ordinarily, it is not said that an 'appeal is instituted', but an appeal is only preferred. I do not think that the above principle is of any assistance to the present case. In the set up in which the word 'proceedings' is found in sec. 91 (1), it cannot be construed in a narrow sense so as to include only the original proceedings pending in the Munsiff Courts. The Amending act has been made applicable to all proceedings commenced before it was brought into force and pending before any Court, Tribunal or other authority as if the principal Act, as amended thereon, was in force when the right accrued or the liability was incurred. It is clear that all the pending proceedings before any Court, Tribunal or Authority shall be disposed of as if the principal Act, as amended thereon, was in force when the right accrued or the liability was incurred. (See Bandu Hamasinga danawade v. Sashikumar ( (1975) 1 Karlj. 241 ). We must also refer to Sec. 133 as amended by the Second Amendment Act, 1974. The said section was made applicable to all proceedings pending before any Civil Court in appeal or revision. The combined operation of Sec. 91 (1) and Sec. 133 covers, in my opinion, all proceedings, original, appeal or revision.

( 5 ) HAVING regard to the averments in the plaint since t

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