( 1 ) IS it permissible to a Motor Accidents claims Tribunal ("claims Tribunal") constituted under S. 110-1 of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939 ("act") to entertain an application for compensation made under S. 110-A of the Act, if not made within six months of the occurence of the accident and if so permissible, when?

( 2 ) IF a Claims Tribunal fails to entertain such an application and makes an award accordingly, is it open to the High Court in an appeal preferred against such an award by an aggrieved person under S. 110-D of the Act to entertain such an application? are the two important questions which arise for our determination in this miscellaneous First Appeal.

( 3 ) ONE Byrappa, a blacksmith, was severely injured on September 26, 1976 in a motor accident, as a result of which he died on the very same day. He left behind his widow, three minor sons, one minor daughter and one married daughter. The widow and the children made an application for compensation on September 26, 1977 under s. 110-A (1) of the Act before the claims Tribunal, Bijapur. As the application was filed after the expiry of the period of six months from the date of occurrence of the accident, the time allowed for making such an application under S. 110a (3) of the Act, another application purporting to be under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act") supported by an affidavit showing cause for entertainment of the application for compensation filed after the expiry of time, was also filed. The Claims Tribunal issued notices to the persons against whom the claim for compensation was made by the widow and children o,f the deceased, pursuant to the notices received by the persons against whom the claim for compensation was made, they appeared and objected to the entertainment of the application filed after the expiry of time. The Tribunal, despite an elaborate enquiry held by it on the application filed under S. 5 of the limitation Act, did not choose to entertain the application made under s. 110-A (1) of the Act, as in its view the widow was not prevented by 'sufficient cause' in making the application in time. Consequently, the tribunal dismissed the claim application filed under S. 110-A (1) of the Act and made an award of dismissal dated March 23, 1978. The widow and her children, who were aggrieved against the award of dismissal made by the Claims Tribunal, having preferred therefrom before this court an appeal under S. 110-D of the act, the appeal is now before us for consideration. While the appellants in the appeal are the aforementioned widow and children of the deceased Byrappa, the respondents in the appeal are the owner, the insurer and the driver of the motor vehicle, out of the use of which the motor accident in question occurred resulting in the death of Byrappa. We wish to state at the outset that though the appellants had made an application under S. 5 of the limitation Act showing cause as to why they sought from the Claims Tribunal entertainment of their application for compensation filed after the expiry of time allowed by law, it is not in dispute before us that the said application has been treated by the Claims tribunal as an application made under the proviso to S. 110-A (3) of the Act and is disposed off as one made under that provision.

( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the contesting parties, having conceded before us that the said course adopted by the Claims Tribunal being the right and proper course which it ought to have adopted, submitted that it would be necessary for us to determine the questions which have arisen for our consideration in this appeal as if the application made under S. 5 of the limitation Act by the appellants was an application made by them under the proviso to S. 110-A (3) of the Act.

( 5 ) AS we agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for the contesting parties, we propose to determine the questions which arise for our consideration in the appeal having regard to the scope

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