S. G. DODDAKALE GOWDA, J.

( 1 ) THE petitioners have challenged the notifications No. LAQ I CR 127/81-1982 dt. 25-1 1982 and Notfn. No. RD 63 AQH 1982 dt. 18-5-1982 issued under sub-sec. (1) of ss. 4 and 6 respectively of the Karnataka land Acquisition Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') declaring that the lands belonging to them are needed for a public purpose, to wit, construction of a temple, on the ground such an action is impermissible in a secular State. After deletion of Cl. (f) of Arts. 19 and 31 the petitioners can neither complain of infringement of their fundamental right to hold property nor contend that it is not for public purpose. But relying on the insertion of the word 'secular' in the pre. amble by 42nd Amendment and Art. 27 of the Constitution it is contended that acquisition for the construction of a temple is opposed to the concept of secular state ; the State cannot propagate or promote any religion and public revenue cannot be utilised for acquisition of land for the said purpose. An attempt to define the expression 'secular' by 45th Amendment was not successful. Except challenging the notifications, the provisions providing for acquisition are not challenged in this writ petition. Though it is not disputed that the acquisition is for a public purpose it is necessary to refer to the scope and ambit of 'public Purpose' as defined in the Act for a proper appreciation of the ground of attack. 'public Purpose' includes making provision for any charitable trust, as defined in S. 3 (f) (ix) of the Act. Explanation to this clause reads as follows :"charitable trust' includes a trust established or to be established for the relief of poor, education, medical relief or advancement of any other object of general public utility". " 'charity' in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions; trust for the relief of poverty, trust for the advancement of education, trust for the advancement of religion and trust for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding",as per the dictum of Lord. Macnaughten in 1891 AC 531. In Tudor on 'charities' it is stated proposition that religious purposes or religious societies or institutions are objects of charity would seem established by authority.

( 2 ) THERE is no novelty in attacking the validity of the acquisition of this type. In Varkey Devagsy v. State of Kerala (1) justice P. Govindan Nair while upholding the validity of acquisition for the con. struction of a temple stated thus :"if a section of the general public is benefited by the acquisition, the purpose must be a public purpose. Public temples are meant to serve the general public So the acquisition for establishment of a temple or a church or a mosque must normally be for a public purpose. Counsel for the petitioner has not referred me to any decision where it has been ruled that acquisition for a temple cannot be an acquisition for a public purpose. I, therefore, negative this contention".

( 3 ) SO also in Amulya Chandra Banerjee v corporation of Calcutta (2) the Privy Council held that the acquisition of certain properties by the Corporation of Calcutta for building a Dharmashala for accommodating pilgrims resorting to a Hindu temple was for a public purpose. Reconstruction of damaged worshipping places during disturbance at the cost of the Government has been held to be valid, vide K. Reghunath v. State of Kerala (3 ). If damaged places of worship could be reconstructed at the cost of the Government proprio vigore, there is no bar for construction of a temple. A charitable institution dedicated to the public, serves 'public purpose'. In schemes formulated by the Bangalore development Authority for acquistiion, certain space is reserved for cultural activities, play ground etc. If a certain space is reserved for the construction of a temple, will the scheme including acquisition become invalid ? So also in acquisitions made for the purpose of village extension, sp

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