The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the provisions of the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, specifically regarding the applicability of exemption provisions and the definition of 'debt'.

( 1 ) RESPONDENTS in C. R. Ps. Nos. 780 and 781 of 1982 are represented by Sri. M. Dasappa, learned Advocate. The remaining respondents are absent

( 2 ) COMMON question of law arises in these C. R. Ps. and therefore a common order is being passed.

( 3 ) THE petitioners-Chit Fund Corporation obtained decrees against respondent 1 in these matters towards the recovery of instalments regarding a chit. They executed the decrees in the Court of Munsiff, Mandya. The concerned respondents raised a contention that they are debtors under Karnataka Debt Relief Act. The Act that was in force at the time when the contention was raised is the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976 (here-inafter referred to as the Old Act ). During the course of the enquiry the Karnataka Debt Relief Act of 1980 came into force. This Act, in the course of the order, will be referred to as the New Act. The petitioners contended that in view of the fact that the decretal amount in each one of the execution cases is not a debt in the sense that no amount had been loaned to the respondents as borrowers and the same was not recoverable as a loan and the concerned respondents were not in law entitled to raise such a contention. The other contention raised is that the petitioners- Corporation falls within one of the exemptions provided in the Old Act. It may be stated here that this contention can also be legally raised taking shelter under the provisions in Sec. 10 of the New Act.

( 4 ) THE executing Court repelled these contentions and held that the concerned respondents are entitled to take a plea that they are debtors under the Acts.

( 5 ) THE first contention is on the basis that S. 10 (1) of the New Act clearly covers the case of the petitioners-Corporation and therefore the Corporation is exempted from the application of the provisions of the New Act and as such of the Old Act also.

( 6 ) SECTION 10 (1) of the New Act reads as follows:"10. Certain debts and liabilities not to be affected: - nothing in this Act shall apply to the following categories of debts and liabilities of a debtor, namely :- (1) any liability incurred or arising under any of the bye-laws of which have been registered. ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

( 7 ) ON facts, it has been nowhere the case of the petitioners that bye-laws have been framed and the same have been registered. Evidently the word registered has been used in relation to any of the provisions relating to registration as found in any statute or law as applicable to this State. In veiw of this position on facts, Sri. B. M. Krishna Bhat, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners in these cases, sought reliance on the decision in Navjeevan Enterprises v. Ramalingiah, (1982) 2 Kant LJ 88 wherein it has been held that the provisions in S. 10 (1) of the new Act is available to Chit Fund Companies. In this case it is urged, there would be no difference even when the petitioner is a Corporation.

( 8 ) IT is true that it has been so laid down in the aforecited decision. The reasoning is found in para 13, in the said decision. With due respect to the learned Judge, the said reasoning does not appeal to me as the plain reading of the provision is more than sufficient to make the meaning explicit in regard to even the intention of the legislature. The reasoning proceeds on the basis that the legislature has clearly exempted the liability in regard to chit transaction because S. 10 (1) of the New Act makes use of the word "any chit". In order to explain the words 'bye-laws of which have been registered' the reasoning proceeds to state that in this state there is no law regulating the chit transaction as is seen to exist in other States. The provision in S. 10 (1) of the New Act does not make out how the bye-laws have to be registered and where they are to be registered and therefore the words 'bye-laws of which have been registered' have to be construed as broadly giving the widest meaning possible to the term 'bye-