( 1 ) THIS civil petition preferred by a Claimant in a fatal-accident-action raises the question whether the Tribunal constituted by the State Government under Section 110 of the MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1939, 1939 (Act for short) is a "court" subordinate to the high Court so as to attract the general power of transfer under Section 24 CPC. By the notification under Section 110 the 'district Judge' as constituted as the Tribunal. Judicial opinion in the High Court on the point whether the 'district Judge' functions as "persona-Designata" or functions as "court" is not uniform. The petition is before us on its reference to a division Bench by Kudoor, J.

( 2 ) PETITIONER is the wife of a certain C. S. Srikantaiah who died on 9-7-1980 in a motor-accident. She filed MVC 51 of 1981 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims tribunal, Gulbarga, claiming Compensation.

( 3 ) BY the present petition she seeks to invoke the general power of transfer of the high Court under Sec. 24 C. P. C. for the transfer of her case from the Tribunal Gulbarga, to the Tribunal at Bangalore Metropolitan area. The ground urged is that she is a chronic patient suffering from hypoglycaemia and Low-Blood-Pressure and Vertigo; that she often suffers "bouts of depression" and that in her present physical condition she is unable to stand the 400 mile journey to Gulbarga. First-respondent is the owner of the vehicle and second-respondent is the Insurer. The former, though served, is unrepresented. The Insurer, however, is represented by its learned counsel Sri Sowri raju.

( 4 ) WE have heard Sri. S. P. Shankar and sri. V. Tarakaram, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Sowri Raju, learned counsel for Respondent-2.

( 5 ) THE controversy is not whether there are grounds to grant the petitioner's prayer; but one of its permissibility in law. The contention is that the Motor Accidents claims Tribunal, constituted under Section 110-A of the Act, is not a "court" subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 24 C. P. C. IN STATE OF MYSORE v. K. L. SUBBANNA, learned Single Judge was of the view that the Tribunal, exfacie, is not a court subordinate to High Court so as to render a revision petition under Section 115 CPC maintainable. In REVANNAPPA v. GUNDE RAO, 1973 (2) Mys. L. J. 473. 1983 (1) Kar. L. J. 361. Swami, J. has, in a similar context, on a review of the authorities, held that the Tribunal is not a "court" subordinate to the High Court. 5. The distinction between the concepts, of a court and a Tribunal consists in that though both are vested with, and exercise, the "judicial power" of the State, a "court" as part of the system of ordinary civil Courts of the land, exercises the "judicial power" to try all cases of a civil nature, excepting those whose cognizance is either expressly, or by implication barred; while the Tribunal has and exercises "judicial power" in special matters statutorily conferred and delimited. On considerations of policy, the "judicial power" of the state is transferred to and exercised by the "ordinary courts of the land", or "the courts of the country" as they are known. They are part of the ordinary heirarchy of courts of civil judicature; but there is nothing to prevent the State from entrusting its "judicial power" in special matters and in special disputes to judicial "tribunals". So both derive their power from and, partake of, a common source, - the "judicial power" of a sovereign State. They necessarily share the common features characteristic of and incidental to the very nature of the power they exercise; and to the commonness of the source of that power. In the case of Courts, however, the procedure followed by, and usually associated with, them and the possession of certain inherent and subsidiary powers intended" to help them to effectuate their task are described as the usual "trappings" of the Courts. But the presence of some or all of these "trappings" in an adjudicatory-forum is not necessarily conclusi

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