The impugned action violated the petitioner's fundamental rights and the constitutional guarantees of the right to live and the right to an adequate means of livelihood.

( 1 ) "but as a system of case-law develops, the sordid controversies of litingants are the stuff out of which great and shining truths will ultimately be shaped. The accidental and the transitory will yield the essential and permanent"- benjamin Cardozo this writ petitioner has a chequered career, in as much as on two prior occasions, he had entered the portals of this Court in quest of justice, the cases being, w. P. No. 24491/1982 and W. P. No. 2843/1976. On both occasions, the Court had allowed the writ petitions remitting the cases back for enquiry with a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner for a fair hearing of his objections to the acquisition of what was left out of his original holding devoted to agriculture.

( 2 ) WHAT is material for deciding the fate of this case is whether the petitioner himself would be rendered a landless destitute if the acquisition of his land is upheld. The sad part of the story of this forlorn agriculturist is that he has already been relieved of agricultural holding to the extent of 2 acres and 30 guntas by virtue of an earlier acquisition for similar purpose of grant of vacant sites to the rural house-less among weaker sections. As is apparent from the award of the Assistant commissioner, Savanur, dated 11-11-1969 in regard to Survey number 237/2 of Kadapatti village, Kundagol Taluk, Dharwad District, what remains of the agricultural holding of the petitioner who is a bonafide agriculturist is hardly 1 acre and 2 guntas of wet land. The petitioner has a family to support. The purpose of acquisition to distribute sites to the house-less among weaker sections, but obviously not to deprive an agriculturist of all his lands making him a destitute bereft of the means of livelihood. If the second acquisition is given effect to, the consequences befalling the petitioner would be infernal and the position anamolous. The petitioner will have to set out on a voyage of misery with a begging bowl in his hands clamouring for succour seeking fresh grant of land for sheer survival. In the rudderless boat are crammed the dependants of the hapless petitioner resigned to fate with an uncertain future in an unkind world. I cannot believe that the act intends such an inverted process of total deprivation followed by subsequent rehabilitation for the purpose of granting lands to the poor and the house-less. One man's meat is another's poison. Such a paradox compounding the spirit of man with ludicrous sadism, annihilating the concept of human rights is hardly reconcilable with the object of the legislature. I refuse to believe that 'rob Peter and pay Paul' is the underlying policy of the benevolent legislation. The dreaded consequence is not, a result of schematic postulation but only a fallacy stemming from misconceived application of the statute. The material consideration is lost sight of by respondents-2 and 3.

( 3 ) THE question is, even if human dignity cannot be assured, can the 'right to live' be taken away from the ordinary citizen?

( 4 ) WE are in a new area of human rights as property rights. Does it need conceptual re-thinking in order to make the concept of property consistent with a democratic society and if so, are such changes incapable of attainment in the era of human rights?

( 5 ) THE meaning of the word 'property' cannot be imprisoned within the confines of the lexicographer or the dictionary but it goes deeper than it appears on the face of it.

( 6 ) AS late as the 17th century, it was not unusual for the writers to use the word in what seems to be an extraordinarily wide sense. John Locke repeatedly expounded men's properties as their lives, liberties and estates. For Hobbes, the things in which man had property included "his own life and libs; and in the next degree, (in most men), those that concerned conjugal affection, and after them riches and means of living". One's rights and liberties were regarded as individual property. They were perceived as even more cardina