The main legal point established in the judgment is the liberal interpretation of the term 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in condoning the delay in filing an application under Order IX, Rule 9 CPC.

( 1 ) P. MISC. NO. 131/85 before the trial Court of the Civil Judge at Shimoga came to be dismissed for default on 19-9-1987 and that was an application for permission to sue as an indigent person filed by the present appellant. On 9-12-1987 she filed an application in misc. case No. 131/85 before the same Court for setting aside the order of dismissal under order IX Rule 9 C. P. C. Obviously this was beyond the period of 30 days fixed for filing such application under Order IX, Rule 9 cpc. Along with that an Inter locutory application also came to be filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in Tiling the said application.

( 2 ) IN support of this application in the affidavit two grounds were stated as constituting sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In the first instance the applicant stated that she came to know about the order on 21-9-1987. Her counsel advised to obtain certified copies of the order. She applied for the same and copies were obtained on 21-11-1987. Immediately thereafter this petition came to be filed. As far as the cause for not being present on the date of hearing she made an averment in the application that she was ailing with heart trouble, she could not attend the Court and the adjournment sought for by her counsel was rejected. This is how she was prevented from being present in Court on the date of hearing.

( 3 ) THE trial Court in the first instance held the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation act are not applicable inasmuch as no certified copy of the order was required to be filed along with the application under Order ix, Rule 9 CPC. It observed that sub-section (2) applies only for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a Judgment and hence Section 12 is out of question. When this was so it disposed of the Inter locutory application holding that when the same is the ground invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it cannot be considered as a sufficient cause to condone the delay. In its opinion it was only to otherwise circumvent the provision of law which was not applicable. Having so rejected the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it dismissed the petition itself as barred by time. It is this order that is now challenged in this appeal.

( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant though conceded that Section 12 of the limitation Act does not go to the aid of the appellant herein urged that the Court ought to have considered the same cause under section 5 of the Limitation Act as constituting sufficient cause when Order IX, Rule 15 cpc makes the said provision clearly applicable even to applications of this nature. Learned counsel for the respondents at the outset contended that appeal cannot lie against the impugned order inasmuch as it is not considered on merits but only dismissed as barred by time while rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Therefore the revision alone could have been a proper course open to the appellant herein.

( 5 ) TO substantiate this argument my attention has been drawn to a decision of this Court in the case of Kanaji Moorarji and Ors. v sripati Venkataramana Hegde (1979 (1) Kar. LJ. 249) wherein the provisions of Sections 100, 115 and Order 41, Rule 4 CPC were considered. Though Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not directly in question and the appeal was disposed of as having abated the Court held that the decision was not a decree passed on appeal within Section 100 of CPC for admitting of an appeal and hence a revision was maintainable. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme court in the case of S. Kalawati v Durga prasad and anr. (AIR 1975 S. C. 1272 ). The learned Judges observed that after the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in this case it must be taken to be settled that a "decision in appeal" would imply that the court had dealt judicially with the decision of the court below after entertaining the appeal a