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1990 Supreme(Kar) 82

Karnataka High Court
MARUTHI - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF KARNATAKA - Respondent
Decided On : 02-22-90
W.A. : 314 of 1990

Advocates:
A.K.SUBBAIAH, CHANDRASEKARAN, I.G.GACHCHINAMATH

The availability of an alternative remedy by way of an election petition after the election and the discretion of the court to decline to invoke its writ jurisdiction in an election dispute if the alternative remedy is available.

Headnote:

Election - Jurisdiction of Article 226 - Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 - Section 21, 23 - The court declined to entertain a petition under Article 226 against the order of the returning officer rejecting a nomination paper, citing the alternative remedy of an election petition. The court emphasized that the process of election commences from the date of publication of the election calendar, and any illegality committed from that stage is covered by the grounds for declaring the election void as enumerated in Section 23 of the act. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in S. T. Muthusami v K. Natarajan and others (AIR 1988 SC 616) and held that it is not just and appropriate to exercise the jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution and interfere with the election process which has already commenced.

Fact of the Case:

The appellants sought to challenge the rejection of their nomination papers by the returning officer. The court declined to entertain the writ petitions, citing the availability of an alternative remedy by way of an election petition.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the remedy by way of an election petition is available after the election, and at this stage, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not required to be exercised.

Issues: The main issue was whether it is just and appropriate to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the returning officer rejecting a nomination paper or rejecting it in so far as it purported to relate to a reserved seat and accepting the same as the one filed for a general seat.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the process of election commences from the date of publication of the election calendar, and any illegality committed from that stage is covered by the grounds for declaring the election void as enumerated in Section 23 of the act. The court emphasized the availability of an alternative and effective remedy through a special tribunal for resolving election disputes.

Final Decision: The writ appeals were dismissed, and all contentions raised by the appellants were left open.

SWAMI, J.

( 1 ) WRIT appeal No. 314/1990 is preferred against the order dated 6 2-1990 passed in w. p. no. 2741/90. The lant was the petitioner in the writ petition. He sought for quashing the order daied 2-2-1990 passed by the assistan: commissioner. Bagalkot and returning officer (election officer) city municipal council, bagalkot rejecting his nomination paper. Learned single judge has declined to entertain the writ petition on the ground that an alternative remedy by way of an election petition is available.

( 2 ) WRIT appeal No. 315/1950 is preferred against the order dated 8-2-1990 passed in writ petition No. 2888/90. The appellant was the petitioner in the writ petition. He has sought for quashing the order dated 5-2-1990 passed by the returning officer, city municipal council, elections, ranebennuf, dhatwar district rejecting his nomination paper for reserved seat and accepting and treating it as the one for general seat. Learned single judge has declined to entertain the writ petition on tne ground that there is an alternative remedy by way of an election petition in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in nanhoomsl v hira msl (AIR 1975 SC 2140) and s. t. muthusami v k. Natarajan and others (AIR 1988 sc616 ).

( 3 ) AS common question of law is involved in both the appeals, the same are heard together.

( 4 ) THE point for consideration is as to whether it is just and appropriate to entertain a petition under article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the returning officer rejecting a nomination paper or rejecting it in so far as it purported to relate to a reserve seat and accepting the same as the one filed for a general seat.

( 5 ) WE are not going into the merits of the case of each of the appellant as we are of the view that in the light of the decision of the supreme court in s. t. muthusami v k. Natarajan and others (AIR 1988 SC 616) it is not the stage at which the jurisdiction under article 226 of the constitution is required to be exercised. It is contended on behalf of the appellants/petitioners that the remedy by way of an election petition is available only after the election and in that what has to be challenged is the election of a councillor but at this stage what is challenged is the rejection of the nomination paper and not the election of a councillor. Therefore, the remedy by way of an election petition provided under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the act) at this stage, cannot be considered to be an alternative remedy. It is not possible to accept this contention. No doubt. Section 21 of the act opens with the words "no election of a councillor shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to the election tribunal within fifteen days from the date of the declaration of the result of the election," but the process of election of a councillor under the act and the rules commences from the date of publication of election calendar. Any illegality committed from that stage is covered by the grounds for declaring election to be void as enumerated in Section 23 of the act. Therefore, the contention that the remedy available is only to challenge the election of the councillor and not the rejection of the nomination paper cannot at all be accepted. Acceptance or rejection of the nomination paper takes place after the commencement of election process which commences from the date of publication of election calendar and ends on the declaration of the results of the election.

( 6 ) IN muthusami's case (AIR 1988 SC 616) the Supreme Court considered the following question:"whether it is appropriate for the high court to interfere with an election process at an intermediate stage after the commencement of the election process and before the declaration of the result of the election held for the purpose of filling a vacancy in the off ice of the chairman of a panchayat union under the Provisions of the tamil nadu panchayats Act, 1958 (





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