The main legal point established in the judgment is that a liberal construction of the expression 'interest in the estate of the deceased' as per the Indian Succession Act is not warranted in the context of grant of probate, and the meaning must be restricted to serve the limited purpose of the Act and granting of the probate.

( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the Order dated 13th March, 1990 made by the learned probate Judge of this Court in Probate C. P. No. 13/89.

( 2 ) THE facts leading to this appeal may bestated briefly and they are as follows: one Dr. G. M. Mascarenhas filed Probate c. P. No. 13/89 in this Court seeking probate of the last Will and testamentary disposition of one miss. A. B. Madappa also known as Babs, since deceased. The Court admitted the petition and issued direction for citation, in one issue of Times of India dated 2-9-1989, that direction was carried into effect by the petitioner in the Probate court. But even before the citation was given effect to by the Court, the appellant before us had entered caveat in probate Court and, therefore, the question arose in the Probate Court whether the appellant before us could be said to have locus standi to enter caveat. In deciding that question, the learned Judge has considered the provisions made in Section 283 (1) (c) of the indian Succession Act read with Section 284 (1) of the same Act. In the course of the order made, the learned Judge has chosen to place reliance on the decision of the High Court of Madras in the case of M. K. Sowbhagiammal and Another v Komalangi Ammal and Another, AIR 1928 madras 803, wherein Venkatasubba Rao, J. , held that "interest in the estate of the deceased" occurring in clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 283 was limited to a direct interest and could not be hi the nature of any other claim by way of title or other remote interest. He also devised the test to find out the nature of interest as to whether it would fall within the expression "interest in the estate of the deceased" as follows:"has the caveator the necessary interest? the test is, does the grant displace any right to which the caveator would otherwise be entitled ? If so, he has such an interest; if not, he has not. "

( 3 ) THIS dicta of the learned Judge was in disagreement with the earlier decision of the same High Court in the case of Jamni Hanmantha rao v Aratala Lachamma, AIR 1926 Madras 1193.

( 4 ) IN the case of ZXS. Sriramiah Setty v Smt D. Kanawnvna, AIR 1971 Mysore 148, Chandrashekhar, J. , as he then was, chose to follow the later ruling of the Madras High Court as the one giving the correct view of the law. Regard being had to that, the learned Probate Judge felt himself bound by the decision already rendered by the learned single Judge of this Court and therefore held that the caveat was not maintainable and consequently declared that the caveator had no locus standi to lodge the caveat and it was accordingly ordered.

( 5 ) AGGRIEVED by the said order, the present appeal is preferred under Section 4 of the karnataka High Court Act, 1961, to the Division Bench.

( 6 ) BEFORE us Mr. B. P. Holla, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, canvassed the following propositions for our consideration with a view to persuade us to liberally construe the expression "interest in the estate of the deceased" occurring in clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 283 to include the interest of a joint owner in the part of the estate disposed of in the Will, an item of the estate disposed of in the will, in respect of which probate had been sought. The proposition made by him was that one co-owner may enter caveat in respect of a will alleged to have been executed by the other co-owner. In order to sustain the proposition or make it more acceptable to us, he placed great reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Ram Pasricha v Jagannath and others, AIR 1976 SC 2335. The passage relied upon by the learned counsel occurs in Paragraph-28 and is as follows: "28. Mr. V. S. Desai reads to us from 'salmond on Jurisprudence' (18th edition) and relies on the following passage in Chapter 8 (Ownership), paragraph 46 at page 254:"as a general rule a thing is owned by one person only at a time, but duplicate ownership is perfectly possible. Two or