The main legal point established is the significance of timely implementation of court directives, the completeness of contempt upon breach, and the rejection of excuses based on bureaucratic delays or intended appeals.

M. F. SALDANHA, J.

( 1 ) WE need to prefix this judgment with the observation that instances of object disregard of judicial orders at all levels seems to have become the order of the day as far as the State and Public authorities are concerned giving rise to a virtual multiplication of unnecessary post decisional litigation which has almost reached epidemic proportions. The problem is not acute. It is not chronic, it is virtually malignant. The question that is legitimately being posed in this situation is as to whether the law has any teeth left and the present situation appears to have stemmed from the impression of the authorities. That the law has not only lost its teeth but also its gums. It is in these circumstances that it has become necessary for us to deal at some length with this issue because this High Court alone as of now is unnecessarily over burdened with almost three thousand contempt proceedings which is a virtual national record!

( 2 ) AN impression is unfortunately current that in those of the cases where a judicial order does not specify a prescribed timeframe for implemen tation, that the authority can postpone it indefi nitely and still canvass the plea that no breach has been committed because no deadline had been set. Secondly, an erroneous impression prevails that unless the beneficiary of the order formally procures a certified copy thereof and serves it on the authority, that there is no obligation existent to carry out the directive. The favourite explanation put forward, apart from the last one, particularly by State Departments, is that an appeal was in tended and, therefore, the non-implementation is justified during the interim period. It has also become almost a ritual with public authorities, long after the institution of contempt proceedings to report compliance with an air of confidence as though they have done something praiseworthy, coupled with the parallel explanation that the already over burdened Courts will most willingly drop the proceedings. Lastly however, the au thorities are supremely confident of the fact that howsoever gross the misconduct, whatever be the harassment and torture and loss to which the citizen has been subjected and the utter wast age of precious judicial time, that every thing can be wiped out with one stroke of an apology. We deem it necessary to rectify this state of affairs and to make it known both clearly and firmly that the attitude which this Court will adopt in contempt proceedings will be a virtually nonsense proce dure and that the dignity of the rule of law and its efficacy will be enforced at all costs.

( 3 ) IT would be useful at this stage, to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Advo cate General, State of Bihar v. M. P. Khair Indus tries Ltd. , AIR 1980 SC 946"but, on the other hand, it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial pro cess and which thus extends its pernicious influ ence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding, and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the expression "contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. "in this context, it would be useful to recall the words of Frankfurter, J. in this regard wherein he has observed :-"it is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestat

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