The delay caused by the State's default in making a reference should be excluded while computing the limitation period, as per S. 15(2) of the Limitation Act.

( 1 ) AN inter-related though important facet of law touching the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the Limitation Act has come up for decision in this appeal. Briefly stated, the controversy centres around the question as to whether the State which is obliged to make a reference to the Court under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act in a case where an application for enhanced compensation has been filed, fails to do so for a considerable period of time, can thereafter object to the Court considering the reference on the ground that it is filed beyond the period of limitation. Though it would appear prima facie incongruous that the defaulting party namely the State should at all be permitted to object on the ground of limitation when that delay has occurred due to the default on the part of its own officers, and that, therefore, normally they should be estopped from canvassing any bar, the situation is far more complex because of certain provisions of law and several judicial decisions. At the same time, I need to take cognizance of the fact that the law must strictly stand clear of impediments, real or artificial, if a Court finds that they are impeding the paramount objective, namely that complete justice must be done to both parties. That a poor agriculturist whose only source of sustenance is being taken away because of the acquisition, even if it be for a public purpose, must get the full benefit of what the law entitles him to, can never be disputed and the term 'full entitlement' will have to be interpreted to mean even such higher amount as may be determined by a competent forum in a companion case at a later point of time. This is the essential spirit behind the promulgation of S. 28 (A) of the Act whereunder a party is entitled to claim enhanced compensation at the hands of the Land Acquisition Officer himself and if this be the legislative intent, a Court would be obliged to ensure that the law is given effect to in full letter and spirit. Conversely, the Legislature has also provided for a prescribed timeframe within which claims will have to be adjudicated and for good reason. The Courts have interpreted at different times the provisions of the Limitation Act and it is true that after the efflux of a certain period of time due to non-action a claim would get extinguished, when it may be still enforced as the Limitation Act itself makes certain provisions for extension, is really the controversy in this appeal. A few facts and dates would,therefore, be relevant.

( 2 ) THE State of Karnataka through the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Minor Irrigation Project, Gulbarga District has preferred this appeal which is directed against a judgment dt. 11-10-1993 in LAC No. 31/ 1990. The applicant is one of the agriculturists whose agricultural land was acquired for an irrigation project. The land had measured approximately 7/1/2 acres and the Land Acquisition Officer had awarded Rs. 3,500/- per acre as the lands in question were dry lands. The notice under S. 12 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act was served on 18-6-1984 and the application for filing a reference to the Court under S. 18 (1) was filed on 6-7-1984. This application under normal circumstances would have been time-barred in September, 1987. It transpired that no reference was made to the Court and the claimant who is the present respondent to this appeal filed an application under S. 18 (1) before the Civil Court in November, 1989, approximately 51/2 years after the award had been made. The learned trial Judge decided the reference on merits and came to the conclusion that a sum of Rs. 8,000/- per acre ought to be awarded because this Court while deciding MFA 1918/1991 awarded compensation at that rate. The copy of that judgment was produced before the learned trial Judge. It is true that the trial Court has observed after considering the fair computation that a figure of Rs. 7,000/- per acre is what the Court considers fair but in view