( 1 ) A rather unusual difficulty arose in this proceeding which has thrown up an interesting aspect of the law namely the question as to whether the provisions of Section 151, Civil Procedure Code can be pressed into service in order to get over certain other insurmountable legal hurdles, one of which is the bar of limitation. The petitioner before me is the original judgment-debtor and it is pointed out that a decree came to be passed against her on 20-10-1978. In respect of that decree, execution proceedings were taken out as late as 15-1-1990 which is almost on the eve of the decree getting time-barred. Undoubtedly, the proceedings were technically in time and the court entertained them but the record indicates that for one-and-half years thereafter the necessary procedures were not compiled with and ultimately the executing Court dismissed the application. On 10-7-1991, i. e. after 33 days, an application was made under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code for restoration of the proceedings which by implication meant setting aside the order dated 7-6-1991. The lower Court passed a short order mentioning that the applicant could not reinstitute the execution proceedings as the period of limitation was over and that even though numerous opportunities were given and the needful had not been done earlier, that the Court proposes to give the applicant one more chance. Therefore the proceedings were restored. Notice being issued to the original judgment-debtor, she filed an application styled as objections before the lower court pointing out that the application filed under Section 151, civil Procedure Code was not maintainable in law because it cannot be termed as an application for setting aside the dismissal order and more importantly, on the ground that such an application was not maintainable because the period of limitation within which an order of dismissal could be set aside namely 30 days had already elapsed and that therefore, even assuming the decree-holder desired to apply for setting aside the dismissal order dated 7-6-1991, that it was condition precedent for an application for condonation of delay to be first filed and that none of these applications could have been granted without notice to the judgment-debtor and that consequently, the order dated 12-7-1991 restoring the original proceeding should be reconsidered and set aside. The lower Court after hearing the parties negatived the objection that by restoring the matter, the period of limitation had virtually been extended and that the legal requirements had been by-passed and observed that the inherent powers vested in the Court under Section 151, Civil procedure Code were wide enough to permit the Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction and restore the original proceedings. The Court had occasion to observe that the question of limitation did not arise because the original proceeding was not in any case a time-barred one. The present civil revision petition is directed against that order.

( 2 ) THE petitioner's learned Advocate submits that there has been a wholesale breach of almost every conceivable provision of law including the procedural requirements of law and that therefore, the order of the lower Court must be set aside. He points out to me that in the first instance the execution application having been dismissed and the application for restoration having been filed after the period of limitation, that it could not have been entertained unless it was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. Learned Advocate also assailed the invocation of the provisions of Section 151, Civil procedure Code by pointing out that it is only under the provisions of Order 9, Civil Procedure Code that an application for setting aside the order of dismissal could have been made and that therefore, the application itself was misconceived. His further submission was that since the period of limitation had expired, that rights have accru