( 1 ) THESE two groups of civil revision petitions need to be subdivided in so far as the first group of 9 civil revision petitions have been presented by the insurance company and they assail the validity of the order passed by the Tribunal holding the insurance company liable to pay the compensation in relation to the incident that took place on 28-10-1989. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the Truck DIG 8377 belonging to the original second respondent and which was being driven by the original R-1, was operated in a rash and negligent manner and that it was responsible for the damage that occurred to the property of the claimants. What is pointed out by the learned advocate who represents the petitioners is that it is well-settled law that the primary responsibility in the case of a motor accident is not that of the insurance company. The liability in law undoubtedly devolves on the driver and the owner where the compensation is attributable to the accident caused while the insured vehicle was being operated. The learned Advocate for the petitioners submits that the insurance company is vicariously liable in law in so far as the spirit of the insurance policy is that it will indemnify the insured, subject to certain limits, in respect of all claims for compensation that may arise as a result of an accident. In other words, the learned Advocate submits that it is only if the insured are found liable, that the insurance company can be compelled to discharge that liability and he demonstrates that if for any reason, the insured are not parties to the proceeding and there is no award of compensation against the insured, that the insurance company cannot be made liable in isolation. The submission proceeds on the footing that it is only the discharge of the liability which is foisted on the insurance company by virtue of the existence of the policy and that if for any reason, there is no award of compensation made against the insured parties, that an award made against the insurance company would be bad in law. The reason for this, as pointed out by the learned Advocate, is that there is no primary liability on the part of the insurance company to pay compensation in the case of an accident, but that the responsibility is limited to the extent of paying on behalf of the insured persons the compensation that they would otherwise have been ordered to pay.

( 2 ) ON the facts of the present case, there is considerable substance in this submission because, the petitioners learned advocate has demonstrated to me that an application was presented to the Tribunal by the claimants learned Advocate on 26-12-1990 asking for dismissal of the proceeding as against respondents-1 and 2 namely, the driver and owner of the truck. Pursuant to this application, the Trial Court passed an order dated 5-3-1991 dismissing the proceeding as against respondents-1 and 2. The case proceeded and the Tribunal ultimately held that compensation was payable and passed an award against the petitioner-insurance company who were the insurers of the truck in question. Petitioners' learned Advocates has seriously assailed this order because, he submits that in the aforesaid well-settled position in law, in the absence of an award against the owner, that the order of the Tribunal vis-a-vis the insurance company is bad in law.

( 3 ) THIS position is virtually unanswerable. The respondents'learned Advocate at that stage, pointed out to me that the applicants are all petty shop keepers virtually earning their business on the side walks, that their status is such that they virtually do not know anything about the niceties of these proceedings and that on enquiries with the learned Advocate who conducted the matter, he is informed that it was due to an error of law, that the application was made for dismissal of the proceedings against the owner and driver. He submitted that unless this Court were to show sufficient indulgence and even at thi