V. P. MOHAN KUMAR, J.

( 1 ) THE petitioner challenges Annexure-A order passed by the 6th respondent herein in a proceeding initiated by the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent alleged that he was employed by the 2nd respondent and his services have been terminated with effect from 20-3-1992. He, therefore, filed an application under Section 7 of the payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, seeking payment of gratuity. The petitioner herein appeared and raised various contentions. In view of the fact that the proceeding under the i. d. act is pending, I do not want to pronounce one way or the other on the merits of the case. The controlling authority, 6th respondent herein, considered the objections and held that the 1st respondent is entitled to payment of gratuity as claimed by him. The said order is challenged by the employer in this writ petition.

( 2 ) MR. V. h. upadhyaya, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, raised a preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the writ petition in view of the existence of an efficacious alternative remedy of appeal as provided under Section 7 (7) of the payment of Gratuity Act.

( 3 ) ON this issue Mr. Harikrishna s. Holla learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the order impugned is patently illegal and non est and as such there is no need for him to prosecute an appellate remedy. According to him, the statutes prescribes a period of 3 months' time to make an application under the payment of Gratuity Act. Any application made beyond the period of 3 months should be accompanied by an application to condone the delay. When such an application is made, the authority is bound to entertain the same, deal with the application and after considering the respective contentions, pass an appropriate order disposing of the application to condone the delay. It is only after the delay is condoned that the authority gets jurisdiction to entertain the application for payment of gratuity. In this behalf, he has relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court reported in 1994 lab. Ic 1598. Therein their lordships have stated that what the statute contemplates in the case is an order condoning the delay in filing the application. It is thereafter alone it gets jurisdiction to entertain the application. To be more precise, the learned judges have stated thus:". . . IT is an axiomatic principle of law well recognised in judicial proceedings that the statutory authorities entrusted with the task of determining the rights of parties, before an adjudication on the merits of a claim is made, should see that a valid proceeding is instituted and entertained or pending before that forum which it could consider on merits. In cases, where the institution of any proceeding is conditioned upon any time limit and when a proceeding is instituted beyond the time limit and is accompanied by an application for condonation of the delay in presenting such a claim or petition, unless such a delay is condoned after hearing the parties before it, it could not be legitimately stated that a valid proceeding had been instituted before that forum, to enable it to enter into an adjudication of the claim on merits. Till the delay is condoned by a specific order for that purpose under the signature and authority of the presiding officer of the forum concerned, in law, it should be taken that there is no proceeding, as such, before it. A similar issue had arisen before a learned single judge of this Court in Madura Coats Limited, Tuticorin v Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Palayamkottai, under the very same provision of law, where, nainar sundaram, j. , as the learned judge then was, has held that before the main claim petition could be considered on merits, the delay should first be considered and condoned and orders passed thereon and only thereafter, the legality of the claim on its merits has to be taken up".

( 4 ) THE grievance of the petitioner is that there was no separate order passed by the authority

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