Karnataka High Court
S.I.KAMRUDDIN SHAH - Appellant
Versus
M.R.UMAKANTH - Respondent
Decided On : 10-13-99
Limitation - Recovery of unpaid purchase money - Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964, Section 18 - Suit barred by limitation as possession was taken within two years of the agreement - Court's limited jurisdiction in revision under Section 18 of the Small Causes Courts Act - Revision dismissed
Fact of the Case:
The suit for recovery of unpaid purchase money was decreed by the trial Court, but the defendant challenged the decree, claiming that the suit was barred by limitation as possession was taken within two years of the agreement.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found that the suit was indeed barred by limitation, as possession was taken within two years of the agreement, and the Court's jurisdiction in revision under Section 18 of the Small Causes Courts Act is limited.
Issues: The main issue was whether the suit for recovery of unpaid purchase money was barred by limitation due to possession being taken within two years of the agreement.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court relied on the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964, Section 18, and emphasized the limited jurisdiction of the Court in revision under this section.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the revision petition, stating that there were no merits to the petitioner's contention. No costs were awarded.
( 1 ) THE suit for recovery of unpaid purchase money was decreed by the trial Court and the decree is resisted and challenged in this revision by the defendant-purchaser, which is at Ex. P. 2. Ex. P. 2 reads as follows:"this agreement dated 29th October, 1979 in favour of M. R. Umakanth, s/o M. V. Ramaiah, residing at Door No. 2023, Mandimohallha, turabali Street, Mysore by S. I. Kamaruddin Shah, s/o late Syed Mohiddin, residing in the same number. This day i. e. , 29-10-1979, I have purchased your house for consideration. In the said house, one Sri S. Narayana is residing as mortgagee and the mortgage period is one year and one month more. Immediately after vacation of the premises by the mortgagee and taking possession by me, I will pay Rs. 5,000-00 (Rupees Five Thousand only) and take an acknowledgement (shara) from you and take back this agreement. Executed the agreement accordingly". That being the case, the Trial Court ought to have connected those payments to the suit transaction and that conclusion contra is not correct. The suit is barred by limitation, because Ex. P. 2 is dated 29-10-1979 and within two years thereof possession was taken.
( 2 ) HEARD the Counsel. On the question of limitation, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the dictum of this Court in thomas alias Gibba D'sa v. John D'sa, are as follows:"the father sold certain property and directed the vendee to pay the balance of unpaid purchase money to the vendor's son as soon as he completed 24 years of age and if the vendee failed to pay the amount as mentioned, he should pay the same with interest as soon as the son demanded payment. A suit was filed 22 years after the son completed 24 years of age. Held: (1) The suit was barred by time. The transaction cannot be considered as creating an express trust and hence Section 10 of the Limitation Act was inapplicable. (2) As the due date for payment of the money to the vendor's son by the vendee was the date when the son attained the age of 24 years, the clause directing the vendee to pay the amount on demand should be held to be superfluous and therefore the suit did not fall within the scope of Article 60 of the Limitation Act". and contended that the suit filed in 1989 after the period of 10 years is clearly barred by limitation.
( 3 ) ON the other hand, Sri Shastri, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the possession was really taken in 1989. There was evidence given by the petitioner herein the defendants, remained uncontroverted and unchallenged. Consequently, the suit filed in 1989 is in time. This decision do not apply.
( 4 ) ON the question of possibility of different view on the evidence adduced, the Counsel submitted that in view of the different views taken by the parties, the Trial Court should have connected the payments only to the suit transactions and not otherwise. This argument has to be repelled, in the light of the dictum of this Court in Siddalingappa v. M. C. Moben, wherein, the scope of revision under Section 18 of the Small causes Courts Act is referred below: "before I go into the merits of the contentions urged for the parties, it is necessary to see the scope of the revision petition. Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964 confers revisional power to the High Court to examine whether the decision of the lower Court is according to law or not. It reads:"18. Revision of decrees and orders of Courts of Small causes. The High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of small Causes was according to law, may call for the case and pass such orders with respect thereto, as it thinks fit". The scope of the similar expression found in Section 75 (1) of the provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Malini Ayyappa Naicker (dead) by L. R. v seth Manghraj Udhavdas Firm , in which it was observed that the expression "accordi
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