( 1 ) HEARD the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties.

( 2 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the 23rd respondent the minimum Wages Authority has proceeded to consider the case without condoning the delay. Therefore, he submitted that the petition deserves to be allowed only on that ground.

( 3 ) UNDER the first proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, (for short the Act), the application will have to be filed within a period of six months from the date on which the minimum wages became payable. In this case according to the respondents the amount was due and payable for year 1984-85 to 1989 and that the respondents have not made the application within the stipulated time and further, the respondent ought to have made an application under the second proviso to sub-section (2) of section 20 of the Act which provides that the application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. He also submitted that the authority has not even considered the question of delay before proceeding to pass the final order. On the other hand, it condoned the delay while disposing of the main matter. Therefore, he submitted that the petition deserves to be allowed on that ground and the impugned order be set aside.

( 4 ) HOWEVER, the learned Counsel for the respondent wholly supported the finding of the authority and submitted that no procedure is prescribed to file the application to condone the delay and it is not necessary that the delay should be condoned before passing the final verdict. On the other hand, the Authority has rightly condoned the delay while disposing of the main matter itself. Therefore, that finding does not call for interference.

( 5 ) ADMITTEDLY there was a delay in making the application by respondents 1 to 22. The authority has also not passed the order regarding the condonation of delay before entertaining the application. On the other hand, the delay was condoned while passing the order on main application. In that application, the respondent had alleged that the petitioner had assured them that it would settle their claims which they believed to be true. In view of this the authority has condoned the delay having satisfied with the reasons offered to by respondents 1 to 22.

( 6 ) THE only question that arises for consideration is as to whether, the procedure followed by the Authority in condoning the delay while passing the final order is proper or not?

( 7 ) IT is no doubt true that respondents 1 to 22 have not filed any application to condone the delay. It is held by the Madras High Court in a decision reported in AIR 1955 Mad 569 that neither the Act nor the rules framed thereunder require that there should be any written application to get the benefit of the Second proviso to Section 20 (2) and that Rule 27 only refers to the application contemplated by section 20 (2 ). It is also held in a decision reported in 1994-I-LLJ-261 (Raj) that the application need not be supported by an affidavit for condonation of delay.

( 8 ) IN this case, the petitioner has not raised the objections before the Authority that the application is not maintainable on the ground that the application is not filed. There is no Rule which prescribes that the application should be followed by an LA. to condone the delay as prescribed under Civil Procedure Code. The proviso to Section 20 (2) only says that the application may be admitted after the period of six months when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. Therefore the first argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since there is no application to condone the delay, the application ought to have been dismissed is liable to be rejected.

( 9 ) IT is next contended by the learned, counsel for the pet