( 1 ) COMMON questions arise for consideration in all these writ petitions, which shall stand disposed of by this common order. The answer to the questions turns on the true import of the 'doctrine of pleasure' and the scope of judicial review in cases where the same is invoked. The facts lie in a narrow compass and may be stated at the outset.

( 2 ) PETITIONER in W. P. No. 39747 of 1999 was by an order of the state government appointed as chairman of the urban development authority, hubli whereas petitioners in W. P. nos. 43249 to 43252 of 1999, 41080 to 41083 of 1999 and 40480 to 40483 of 1999 were similarly nominated as members of the urban development authorities of haveri, davangere and shimoga. Petitioners in W. P. nos. 43245 and 43246 of 1999 were nominated as members of city municipal council, shimoga, while petitioners in W. P. nos. 43128 and. 44217 of 1999 were appointed as chairman of the town planning authorities of ranebennur and chintamani. The appointment/nomination of each one of the petitioners as also their continuance was at the pleasure of the government. Their grievance now is against orders issued by the government by which they have been either removed or asked to tender their resignations. The validity of these orders has been assailed on two distinct grounds. It was firstly argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that removal of a nominated member was under the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 permissible only in situations and on the grounds stipulated in Section 6 of the said act. The doctrine of pleasure incorporated in Section 5 of the act was, according to the learned counsel, controlled by the Provisions of Section 6 thereof, so that the government cannot direct the removal of a member except on one of the grounds set out in the latter provision. Alternatively it was contended that the removal of the petitioners and/or the direction that they should tender their resignations was mala fide and vitiated by extraneous considerations. Relying upon the decision of this court in Janab Shastry Khaja Hussain v Karnataka Board of Wakfs, Bangalore and another, it was argued that the validity of an order made on the basis of the pleasure theory could also be examined on the touchstone of Article 14 of the constitution.

( 3 ) JUDICIAL review of administrative decisions is broadly speaking available on the grounds of 'illegality', 'irrationality' and 'procedural impropriety'. A fourth ground viz. , proportionality is also fast gaining judicial acceptance as a possible ground on which an administrative or a quasi-judicial action may be questioned. Lord diplock's oft quoted observations in council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service, that have met the approval of the Supreme Court elaborate the grounds thus:"by illegality. . . . I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and give effect to it. . . . By 'irrationality' I mean what can now be succinctly, referred to as 'wednesbury unreasonableness'. . . . It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. . . I have described the third head as 'procedural impropriety' rather than the failure to observe basic rules of natural Justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice".

( 4 ) THE challenge in these cases is limited to the twin grounds of the impugned orders being illegal in that the same exceed the term of the po