The legal consequences of the dissolution of a partnership firm as per the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and the balance of convenience and irreparable injury are crucial factors in determining the grant of temporary injunction.

( 1 ) THIS is plaintiff's revision directed against the judgment dated 2. 3. 1999 of the learned Prl. Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.), Mysore, passed dismissing plaintiff's appeal in M. A. No. 79/1998, confirming the Trial court's order dated 28. 8. 1998 made in O. S. No. 586/1998 rejecting plaintiff's I. A. No. 1 under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the C. P. C.

( 2 ) THE said suit was instituted by petitioner (hereinafter referred to as 'the plaintiff') against respondents, who were defendants-1, 2 and 3, respectively in the suit, for the relief of preliminary decree directing dissolution of defendant-1 firm, for rendition of accounts and to declare the shares of partners of the firm, who are plaintiff and defendants-2 and 3.

( 3 ) ALONG with the plaint, I. A. No. 1 under Order 39, Rules-1 and 2 of the C. P. C was also filed by the plaintiff praying for an Order of temporary injunction against defendants-2 and 3 restraining them from carrying on the business of defendant No. 1 dissolved partnership firm, "except for the limited purpose of winding up the. firm for completing the transaction", and from alienating or otherwise dealing with the property described in the schedule to the application.

( 4 ) A few relevant undisputed facts are that, defendant-1 partnership was constituted by plaintiff and defendants-2 and 3 by partnership deed dated 1. 4. 1992 to carry on the business in manufacturing and marketing of steel products after establishing a factory for this purpose. Defendant-3 was taken as a partner of the firm individual capacity and as kartha of his Hindu Undivided Family. The share of each partner in the capital of the firm was 25%. The partnership was at will as per Clause No. 3 of the partnership deed. Accordingly, the factory was established, and the manufacturing of steel rolls and their marketing was undertaken and was being carried on by defendant - 1 firm. Since plaintiff was found to have been neglected by defendants-2 and 3 in the matter of business of the firm, as he was not being furnished with the statements of account and the balance sheet of the business and was not being kept informed of the dealings of the firm, he was constrained to issue dissolution notice dated 13. 4. 1998 to defendants stating that by virtue of the said notice, the firm was dissolved by him with effect from 13. 4. 1998. Thereafter, on 28. 8. 1998, he filed the said suit against defendants.

( 5 ) DEFENDANTS have filed their written statement contesting the plaint averments, while admitting the service of the Said dissolution notice of plaintiff. It was further pleaded in their written statement that the plaintiff, along with his wife and relative, formed a separate firm of their own. The statement of objections of I. A. No. 1 was also filed by them reiterating their defence in the written statement and also further contending that the firm had been carrying on its business with a large turnover to the tune of crores of rupees and it had employed about 75 employees and, therefore, the balance of convenience and irreparable injury lay in defendants' favour, as also the plaintiff had no prima facie case entitling him to the equitable remedy of temporary injunction.

( 6 ) BOTH the Courts below, by their considered order and judgment respectively, have held that plaintiff could not make out a case for grant of temporary injunction in his favour. The trial Court's order passed in detail rejecting plaintiff's application for temporary injunction had been thus affirmed by the lower appellate Court by its impugned judgment.

( 7 ) MR. Ramadas, learned Counsel for plaintiff, took me through the relevant provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 ('the Act' in short) as also the above-stated material facts and vehemently contended that both the Courts below mis-conceived the plaintiff's case and failed to take just and proper decision, on the plaintiff's prayer for temporary injunction. It was his contention that by virtue of Section