The Court emphasized that the proviso to Section 27(2)(r) did not provide a bar to a legal proceeding but only provided a cushion time of one year, and its application was not retrospective to earlier proceedings.

( 1 ) THE petitioner before me is the original tenant against whom a proceeding had been instituted under Section 21 (l) (h) of the Karnataka rent Control Act, 1961 by the respondent who was the then landlady. The Trial Court dismissed the suit principally because, the Court was not satisfied with regard to the status of the respondent who had contended that she was a tenant with one Leelavathy and the Court held that there were certain discrepancies with regard to the production of the rent receipts as also with regard to the so-called agreement between the parties and that therefore, the landlady had no case made out for the grant of the relief. The landlord filed a revision against the order of the Trial Court and the learned Principal District Judge, Dakshina Kannada in Rev. (Rent) No. 107 of 1993 reversed the decision of the Trial court. The Revisional Court was essentially satisfied that the landlord had made out a bona fide case for recovery of possession and consequently, decreed the suit. The present house rent revision petition has been directed against that order.

( 2 ) ORIGINALLY, when the petition first came up for hearing, the respondent-landlord through his learned Advocate put forward some offer with regard to the grant of time to vacate but, the petitioner was not agreeable to accept the offer, as her essential submission was that the petitioner is entitled to succeed on merits in the present petition. The main submission canvassed is that by virtue of the repeal of the earlier Rent act and also by virtue of the provisions of Section 70 of the Karnataka rent Act, 1999 that this Court would have to decide the petition on the basis of the provisions of law as are now applicable. It is true that certain changes have taken place as far as this field of legislation is concerned and it is possibly for this reason that the Legislature has desired that even in respect of certain categories of pending proceedings the new provision should apply. In keeping with this principle, Mr. Rao, learned Counsel who represents the petitioner submitted that the Court would have to apply the provisions of Section 27 (2) (r) of the present Act which reads as follows. "27 (2) (R) that the premises let are required whether in the same form or after reconstruction or rebuilding, by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation: provided that where the landlord has acquired the premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under this clause unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of the acquisition". To this extent the learned Counsel is right in his submission. Mr. Rao, thereafter, submitted that while applying these provisions, the court will have to look to the record of the present case because there is a clear-cut finding under two heads as far as the Trial Court is concerned in favour of the present petitioner or in other words against the landlord. The first of these is with regard to the non-mention of the door number of the premises and more importantly, the non-production of some of the relevant rent receipts and as far as this aspect is concerned, the first Revisional Court has given sufficiently good and valid reasons for having not agreed with the Trial Court. In my considered view, the grounds on which the present respondent was non-suited by the Trial court under this head were totally unjustified and the Revisional Court was well-within its rights in having held that the non-mention of the door number and the non-production of some of the rent receipts was inconsequential principally because, the respondent had examined the landlady who has in terms deposed to the fact that the respondent had been her tenant since the year 1991. The second head of ch