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2006 Supreme(Kar) 459
In The High Court Of Karnataka At Ban Galore
V. Jagannathan, J.
S. Shivalingaiah
V.
State Of Karnataka And Others
Writ Petition No. 33857 of 1998 (LR).
16th June, 2006
Sri H.T. Narayan, Advocate for Petitioner;
Smt. M.C. Akkamahadevi, High Court Government Pleader for Respondents-1 and 2;
Sri G.S. Vishweshwara, Advocate for Respondent-3.
Headnote:Constitution of India -Delay and laches -Articles 226 & 227 -Delay and laches -Order in question passed in 1979 -Challenged in 1998 -Considerable delay -Question of condonation of delay is not a rule of law -If grave injustice is likely to be caused, it would be travesty of justice, if refused to condone delay. [V. Jagannathan, J.] - It is a settled law that refusal to entertain belated cases is only a rule of discretion and not of law as has been observed by the Apex Court in a case reported in AIR 12974 SC 259. It is also a settled position in law as has been observed by the Apex Court in a case reported in AIR 1993 SC 802 that the test is not physical running of time and where the circumstance justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. It may also be worthwhile to mention that the question of delay or laches depends upon the peculiar circumstances of the individual cases and no hard and fast rule of universal application can be laid down and since the relief is not necessarily barred on account of delay or laches, ultimately, it is the facts and circumstances that has to guide the decision of the Court in deciding to condone the delay or not.
Delay, Laches and Lapses -Condonation of delay -Condonation of delay -[V. Jagannathan, J.] - Question of condonation of delay is not a rule of law -If grave injustice is likely to be caused, it would be travesty of justice, if refused to condone delay.
The petitioner seeks relief at the hands of this Court and his grievance is that respondent 2-Land Tribunal has passed the order dated 29-8-1979 rejecting the claim of his father for occupancy rights in respect of 1.09 acres of land in Sy. No. 116 and 5 acres of land in Sy. No. 113 of Jeegenahallil Village, Kasaba Hobli, Ramanagara Taluk.
2. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the contesting respondent 3.
3. It is the submission of the petitioner's Counsel that the Land Tribunal was divided in its opinion as to the relationship between the petitioner's father and the landlord. It is submitted that the Chairman of the Land Tribunal did come to the conclusion that there was tenant landlord relationship between the petitioner's father and the respondents before it, whereas all other members of the Tribunal were of the opinion that the petitioner's father was not a tenant. Ultimately, the Land Tribunal held that the decision of the majority prevails and as such, the application filed by the petitioner's father came to be rejected. It is this order that is assailed in this writ petition.
4. It is the submission of the petitioner's Counsel that there is no word whispered in the entire order of the Land Tribunal as to what were the reasons that led the members of the Tribunal to come to the conclusion that the petitioner's father was not a tenant. But, on the other hand, the Chairman had given exhaustive reasons for coming to the conclusion that the contesting respondent was not cultivating the land in question, but he was only using the usufructs from the trees. Therefore, when the Chairman could give reasons for his conclusion, it was also imperative on the part of the other members of the Tribunal to have given their reasons for holding that the petitioner's father was not a tenant. In the absence of reasons being given by the members of the Tribunal, which was very essential for the ultimate conclusion of the case before the Tribunal, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law. Therefore, the learned Counsel submitted that the writ petition requires to be allowed and the impugned order at Annexure-A needs to be quashed.
5. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the contesting respondent, at the outset, submitted that the writ petition itself is not maintainable as it is barred by time inasmuch as the impugned order was passed on 29-8-1979, but the writ petition came to be filed in the year 1998 and the enormous delay in filing the writ petition has not been properly explained by the petitioner. It was further submitted that, even assuming that the impugned order is a void order, still, because of the delay on the part of the petitioner, no interference is called for in respect of the impugned order and to support this contention, my attention was drawn to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi. It was further submitted that the petitioner's father, though was alive when the impugned order was passed, made no efforts to file writ petition till the year 1992 when he died and, therefore, the petitioner's son now cannot be permitted to question the validity of the impugned order and hence, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed for the above reasons.
6. Having heard the submissions made by the respective sides, the questions for consideration is whether, at the first instance, the petitioner has explained the delay in preferring the writ petition? and secondly, whether the impugned order is sustainable in law?
7. So far as the question of delay in filing the writ petition is concerned, the petitioner has explained the reasons for approaching this Court after long period. His explanation is to be found in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 to the writ petition. It is stated that even during his lifetime, the petitioner's father tried to secure the certified copies of the impugned order, but the same could be got only on 15-10-1998 and, thereafter, the writ petition was filed on 2
