2007 Supreme(Kar) 406
2008 (1) KLO 827
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Anand Byrareddy, J.
MFA No. 5576/2005
Chamansab - Appellant
Vs.
Parappa by LRs. - Respondents
Decided on 11-7-2007
Appellant: Sri Dinesh R Kulkarni, Adv.
Respondents: Sri F.S. Dabali, Adv.
Headnote:Motor Vehicles Act -Section 140 - Claim petition - Proof by claimant. [Anand Byrareddy, ,J]: In a petition under Section 140 of the Act, the petitioner would have to satisfy the Tribunal (a) that an accident arose out of the use of a motor vehicle, (b) which resulted in imminent disablement or death of a person and that (c) the claim is made against the owner and insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident. These ingredients would be sufficient to entitle the claimant including the legal representative of a deceased victim, to receive the fixed sum prescribed under the Section without having to establish any other fact or circumstance.
Cased Reffered: AIR 1987 SC 1690; AIR 1977 Guj 195; 1975 ACJ 344 (AP); 1974 ACJ 182 (Mad); AIR 1973 Delhi 67; AIR 1970 Ker 241; AIR 1969 Delhi 183; AIR 1967 Mad 123; 1967 ACJ 297 (Punj).
Motor Vehicles Act -Sections 166 and 163 A - Petitions and claims under - Proof - Distiction. [Anand Byrareddy, ,J]: The claim under this Section is on a "fault hability". The determination of the claim requires a full-fledged trial, unlike under Section 163-A. Special damages can be claimed in addition to general damages. The Tribunal would have to consider several factors in a claim under Section 166, namely, the dependents, their age and the multiplier to be applied as future prospects, apart from the income of the deceased at the time of death, is taken into a account. Compensation towards damage to property may also be claimed under Section 166. Income of the deceased and loss of estate needs to be proved unlike under Section 163-A of the Act, where a minimum is adopted.
Cased Reffered: AIR 1987 SC 1690; AIR 1977 Guj 195; 1975 ACJ 344 (AP); 1974 ACJ 182 (Mad); AIR 1973 Delhi 67; AIR 1970 Ker 241; AIR 1969 Delhi 183; AIR 1967 Mad 123; 1967 ACJ 297 (Punj).
Motor Vehicles Act -Section 166 - Legal representative - Not necessarily be a wife, husband, Parent or Child - Expression legal representative should be given a wider meaning. [Anand Byrareddy, J]: The apex Court has added, that although the Act was extensively modified, pursuant to the 85th report of the Law Commission, the Parliament did not choose to amend S. 110A of the Act by defining the expression "legal representatives" in relation to claim under Chapter VIII of the Act as the spouse, parent and children of the deceased as recommended by the Law Commission. The Commission had opined that the same meaning be given to the expression representiative as had been given to the expression, for purposes of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The fact that the parliament declined to take any action on the recommendation of the Law Commission of India suggests that Parliament intended that the expression legal representative in Section 110A of the Act should be given a wider meaning and it should not be confined to the spouse, parent and children of the deceased. In this view of the matter, in the present case on hand, it can be said that the appellant was a legal representative of his deceased sister, for purposes of S.166 (1) (c) of the Act, even though she was married but later widowed and had been living in the home of the appellant.
Cased Reffered: AIR 1987 SC 1690; AIR 1977 Guj 195; 1975 ACJ 344 (AP); 1974 ACJ 182 (Mad); AIR 1973 Delhi 67; AIR 1970 Ker 241; AIR 1969 Delhi 183; AIR 1967 Mad 123; 1967 ACJ 297 (Punj).
Anand Byrareddy, J.
Heard the Counsel for the parties.
2. The facts of the case are as follows.
The appellant is the brother of one Mardanbi. On 28-10-1995, Mardanbi after drawing water from a public hand pump, was on her way home when she was hit by a tractor-trailer. She died as a result of the injuries suffered. Mardanbi was aged about 45 years at the time of her death, she was a widow without any children. She was living in the home of the appellant.
The appellant claimed that on account of the death of his sister he suffered loss and hardship and claimed compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity), against the driver and the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal rejected the claim of the appellant, though it was found that Mardanbi had died on account of the injuries suffered in the accident and which was attributable to negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle.
The Tribunal has held that the appellant was not entitled to claim any compensation as he was not a legal heir of the deceased. The Tribunal reasoned that the deceased was a married woman, though widowed. And, secondly, held that the appellant could not have been dependant on the purported earnings of Mardanbi, as a coolie, since she herself was dependant on “old age pension” for her survival. It is this which is under challenge in the present appeal.
3. The Counsel for the appellant contends:
That in terms of Section 166(1)(c) of the Act, an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. In the present case the deceased being an issueless widow, who had come to live with the appellant after her husband’s death and the appellant being the natural brother of the deceased the Tribunal was not justified in declaring that the appellant was not a legal heir of the deceased.
4. The Counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, to support the contention that the brother of a deceased person is entitled to maintain a petition under the Act, if he is a legal representative of the deceased.
5. The Counsel would submit that in the face of the fact that there was no objection from any quarter as to the appellant’s claim as a legal representative, the Tribunal was clearly in error. It is also contended that the pension received by the deceased was a supplement to her earnings as an agricultural coolie and the Tribunal was clearly i~ error in finding that the deceased was not earning any money which she could have contributed to the family of the appellant.
6. Per contra, the Counsel for the respondents would seek to support the award and would contend that even if it could be accepted that the appellant was a legal representative of the deceased, a claim for compensation cannot be sustained unless there was a tangible loss to the claimant on account of the death. The appellant had failed to establish this. And further, in the proceedings before the Tribunal, the driver of the vehicle who was a respondent had been placed ex parte. The owner of the vehicle had died during the pendency of the proceedings. The present respondents are the legal repre-sentatives of the said owner. Their obl-igation to meet any claim is totally absent. The Counsel would hence contend that the Tribunal had rightly rejected the claim.
7. On the above contentions, the following questions would arise for consideration in the appeal:
a. Whether the appellant could be considered as a “legal representative” of the deceased, for purposes of Section 166(1)(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988?
b. Whether the appellant could, as a legal representative, claim compensation without reference to dependency?
8. Insofar as the first question is concerned, the