Non-examination of claimants and the doctor who issued the wound certificates is not fatal to the claimants' case, and it is permissible under law to produce such certificates as evidence.

( 1 ) IN all these revision petitions, the petitioner is assailing the validity and legality of the impugned order dated 27. 9. 2001 passed by the Principal District Judge-cum-Motor Accidents claims Tribunal, No. 1, Bellary.

( 2 ) THE facts of the case in brief are that the respondents herein filed the claim petitions before the motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for compensation towards the injuries suffered by them in the accident occurred at Beldota Minas Cross, near Mariyammanahalli on 27. 6. 1997 at 7 a. m. while they were travelling in a K. S. R. T. C. bus bearing registration No. MEF 7452. The further case of petitioner is that claimants have failed to examine themselves in support of their case and the wound certificates pertaining to the injuries suffered by them were produced by the claimants in the MVC cases. The amount of compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal is not justifiable. Assailing the correctness of the common order passed by the Tribunal, the petitioner has presented these revision petitions before this court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure.

( 3 ) THE principal submission of learned Counsel appearing for petitioner in these revision petitions is that the Claims Tribunal has failed to consider the fact of non-examination of the claimants and the claimants have not made any efforts to justify the injuries suffered by them in the accident. Accepting the wound certificates issued by the doctor, the Claims Tribunal has awarded the compensation. Therefore, the award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is not sustainable. The learned Counsel further contended that the Tribunal erred in awarding the compensation. The Tribunal based on the evidence given by the persons who had no knowledge regarding the injuries caused to the claimants has awarded the compensation. Therefore, the petitioner contended that the impugned judgment and award passed by the Tribunal is liable to be rejected.

( 4 ) THE short question that arises for my consideration in these revision petitions is, whether the motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is justified in awarding the compensation to the respondents-claimants?

( 5 ) HEARD the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner for a considerable length of time. Perused the impugned order passed by the Tribunal carefully and reassessed the matter with the assistance of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. I have also re-evaluated the entire material available on record. The records disclose, the wound certificates issued by the doctor have been marked with the consent of the learned Counsel appearing for both parties before the tribunal. The Tribunal considered the wound certificates issued by the doctor and proceeded to award the compensation to the respondents-claimants.

( 6 ) THE submission of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the respondents-claimants have not entered into the witness-box, nor given any evidence. The tribunal has not considered this aspect of the matter and straightaway proceeded to award the compensation on the basis of the wound certificate issued by the doctor, who treated the injured-claimants. It is significant to note that the impugned order reveals that wound certificates issued by the doctor have been marked as exhibits with the consent of parties by the Claims tribunal. Now, at this distance of time, it is not open for the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner to contend that the Tribunal has committed an error without examining the claimants to justify their claims. Suffice it to say, as a matter of fact, the conduct of the petitioner is not fair. The petitioner has not made any sincere efforts to rebut the evidence placed by the claimants before the Tribunal, nor the petitioner entered the witness-box and gave evidence to rebut the documentary evidence available on the record. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no substance. Hence, the