The main legal point established was the interpretation of evidence in determining the nature of a property transaction under Muhammadan Law, particularly the consideration of motives and relationships of the parties involved.

( 1 ) THE appellant is the 2nd wife of one Mohamad Sheriff Saheb who died in Civil Station on 7-7-1944 leaving besides the appellant and her two children, the third wife by name Amina Bee, children by her and some children by his deceased first wife. The third wife and her children sued the children of Mohamad Sheriff by the first wife, the appellant and her children for partition and possession of the share due to them under the Muhammadan Law in the properties of Mohamad Sheriff set forth in two schedules, Schedule A relating to items of immoveable property and Schedule B movables. The value of the movables is stated to be more than a lakh. The appellant who was defendant 1 in the suit claimed item No. 5 of the A schedule as her absolute property not liable for partition and pressed for an item not included in A schedule being added to the properties to be partitioned. The omitted item stands in the name of plaintiff 1. Both the pleas were negatived by the learned District Judge and this appeal is concerned only with item 5 of the A schedule. 2a. On behalf of the appellant the decree of the learned District Judge was attacked firstly on the ground that the suit itself is not maintainable as it was filed not by plaintiff 1 but by her father without proper authority and secondly on the ground that the finding against the appellant in regard to item 5 is vitiated by mis-appreciation of the evidence and wrong inferences from proved facts. 2b. The first point is based on the terms of the power of attorney executed by plaintiff 1 in favour of her father to file and prosecute the suit. Though at first existence of the power of attorney itself was doubted as it is not available in the records of this case and copy of this though applied for could not be given to the appellant, Counsel for respondent has pointed out that it has been exhibited in another case between the parties. It was, however, contended that the power of attorney is to be strictly construed to determine the rights of the agent and so construed he can be deemed to have had authority to file the suit only on behalf of plff. 1 and not on behalf of plff. 1 as next friend of her children plaintiffs 2 and 3. The construction is rather strained and the suit cannot be thrown out even if the rigid construction sought for by the appellant; is adopted as plaintiff 1 is admittedly entitled to a share and the shares of plaintiffs a and 3 will have to be considered even if they were not the plaintiffs. No objection was taken either in the lower court or in the grounds of appeal to the institution of the suit. The parties joined issues, adduced evidence and the matters in controversy are adjudicated upon after a full trial. In view of all this, the appellant cannot at this stage insist on a critical scrutiny of the terms of the power of attorney. The objection on this account is untenable. 3a. The finding on the question of title which is more important requires serious consideration. Admittedly the property was purchased in the name of the appellant as is seen from Ex. 4 dated 23-4-1932. The consideration for sale is stated to be Rs. 3000/ -. Issue No. 4, as it stands, throws the burden of proving that it is not her property rightly on the plaintiffs as according to them the sale in favour of the appellant was benami. In arriving at a finding that the sale was benami the learned Judge seems to have largely been influenced by the endorsement on the sale deed and the recital in the prior agreement of sale that sale price was paid by Mahomad Sheriff and has failed to examine whether there was any reason for Mohamad Sheriff to purchase one property in particular in the name of his wife under Ex. 4. The only evidence with regard to Exhibit 4 is that of the scribe Nanjundiah. (After discussion of the evidence the judgment proceeds:) The evidence does not preclude the possibility of the appellant having paid the sale price through the agency of her husband and this is strengthened by t

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