The interpretation of 'occupation' under the House Rent Control Order and the conditions for the exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India were central legal points established in the judgment.

YENKATA RAMAIYA, J.

( 1 ) THIS petn. is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition to quash the order passed by reap. 1 and for a direction that the said order should not be executed. The ground on which the writs are sought is that the order passed by resp. 1 for eviction of the petnrs. from the premises of which resp. 2 is the owner is without jurisdiction under the provisions of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order. Respondent 3 is said to be an unregistered association of Jains of the Swatambar cult and purchased the building in about the year 1947 for the purpose of running a residential Hindi school. The petnrs. have been the tenants of the premises from a time long prior to the date of the purchase by resp. 2. An appln. made by resp, 2 to the House Rent Controller for eviction of the petnrs. on the ground that it was needed for opening the school was unsuccessful. A similar appln. 61ed in the following year was allowed by the House Rent Controller dismissed by the Labour Comr. on appeal but eventually granted by the Govt. It is this order of Govt. which is attacked by the petnrs. and with respect to which the writs are prayed for.

( 2 ) IT is beyond dispute, this Ct. has jurisdiction to issue the writs as this is clearly provided for in article 226 of the Constitution of India, but the conditions for the exercise of the power are not mentioned therein. The nature of these writs is explained by Atkin L. J. in The King v. Electricity Commrs. , (1924) 1 K. B. 171 at p. 204 : (93 L. J. K. B. 390) thus :

"the matter comes before us upon rules for writs of prohibition and certiorari which have been discharged by the Divisional Ct. Both writs are of great antiquity, forming part of the process by which the King's Cts. restrained Cts. of inferior jurisdiction from exceeding their powers. Prohibition restrains the tribunal from proceeding further in excess of jurisdiction; certiorari requires the record or the order of the Ct to be sent up to the King's Bench Division, to have its legality inquired into, and if necessary, to have the order quashed. It is to be noted that both writs deal with questions of excessive jurisdiction, and doubtless in their origin dealt almost exclusively with the jurisdiction of what is described in ordinary parlance as a Ct. of Justice. Bat the operation of writs has been extended to control the proceedings of bodies which do not claim to be, and would not be recognised as Cts of Justice. Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs. "

As observed by Lord Chancellor (Viscount Simon) in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of parlakimedi, A. I. R. (30) 1943 P. C 164 : (I. L. R. . (1914) Mad. 457) the writ of certiorari does not issue to correct purely executive acts but, on the other hand, its application is not narrowly limited to inferior "courts" in the strictest sense. Broadly speaking it may be paid that if the act done by the inferior body is a juridical act as distinguished from being a ministerial act, certiorari will lie. The order passed by the Govt. against the petnrs. cannot be said to be of a ministerial kind and it is, therefore, necessary to see as to whether it was beyond the powers given to them by the House Rent and Accommodation Control Order.

( 3 ) SRI B. Shankar Rao, the learned counsel on behalf of the petnrs has advanced three contentions to show that the order is one passed in excess of the powers conferred by the House Rent and accommodation Control Order and these are: (i) when once an appln for eviction based on the allegation that the premises were required for running a school was dismissed, a second appln. setting forth the same reason does not lie; (2) Clause 12

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