1950 Supreme(Kar) 26
Karnataka High Court
Judges : Balakrishnaiya
T.BANGARAPPA - Appellant
Versus
RANGANATHA RAO - Respondent
Criminal Revn. Petn. 153 Of 1950-51
Decided On : 10/05/1950
Advocates Appeared :
K.P.Muddappa, MALOOR SUBBA RAO
The principle of double jeopardy, as embodied in Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code, prohibits a person from being tried twice for the same offence, but allows for separate trials for distinct offences arising from the same transaction.
Headnote:
Double Jeopardy - Criminal Procedure - The court held that the acquittal of the accused under Section 56 of the Mysore Police Act for indecent behavior and obstructing passengers in a public place does not bar a trial under Section 355 of the Penal Code for causing dishonour to the complainant. The court interpreted Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code, emphasizing that the offences were distinct and could be separately prosecuted.
Fact of the Case:
The accused was previously prosecuted under Section 56 (o) and (q) of the Mysore Police Act for indecent behavior and obstructing passengers in a public place. The accused objected to the present prosecution under Section 355 of the Penal Code, arguing that it was barred under Section 403 as he had already been acquitted for the same transaction.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the acquittal under Section 56 of the Mysore Police Act did not bar the trial under Section 355 of the Penal Code. The magistrate's decision to overrule the objection was upheld, and the petition was dismissed.
Issues: The main issue was whether the acquittal under Section 56 of the Mysore Police Act barred the trial under Section 355 of the Penal Code for causing dishonour to the complainant.
Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code, emphasizing that the offences were distinct and could be separately prosecuted. It held that the acquittal under Section 56 of the Mysore Police Act did not bar the subsequent trial under Section 355 of the Penal Code.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed, and the magistrate's decision to overrule the objection was upheld.
( 2 ) IT is argued for the petitioner that the offences for which he was prosecuted by the police is substantially the same as the one complained of under Section 355, Penal Code which is not denied to have arisen out of the same transaction and as such the accused should not be tried again for the same offence.
( 3 ) SECTION 403 (1), Criminal P. C. embodies the maxim that no person should be twice-troubled for the same cause. It incorporates the common law principle known as 'autre-fois acquit' which means that no one shall be put into peril twice on the same matter on grounds of public policy. Clause (2) of Section 403 provides that
"a person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge-might have been made against him on a former trial under Section 235 (1), criminal P. C. "
Section 235 (1) enables that where more offences than one are committed from acts in the same transaction, a person may be charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence. The question for consideration is whether the two offences are distinct. The offence complained of under Section 56, Police Act concerns indecent pushing in a public place giving rise to a breach of public peace. The offence now under enquiry is that the complainant was shoe beaten causing him dishonour. In 31 Mys CCR 335' (A), it has been held that affray and hurt caused to an individual in the transaction are distinct offences and the trial of one does not bar the subsequent trial for the other. Mukherji J. in -' ram Sukh v. Emperor', AIR 1925 All 290 (B) held that conviction for affray is no bar for subsequent conviction for causing hurt in the affray. A bench of the bombay High Court have laid down that "conviction of an accused for an offence under Section 160, Penal code on prosecution initiated by the police. . . . . does not bar the subsequent prosecution of the accused for offences under Sections. 323 and 147, Penal Code on a complaint laid by the complainant. " in a recent case reported in -- "thanammal v. Alamelu Ammal', AIR 1940 Mad 224 (C) it was held that a conviction under Section 75, City Police Act is no bar for trial for an offence under Sections. 323 and 352, Penai Code. In effect, the sets of offences in each of these cases are deemed to be distinct though committed in the same transaction.
( 4 ) IN this case, the accused was previously prosecuted under Section 56 (o) and (q ). Clause (o) deals with the offence of indecent behaviour in a public place and clause (q) with the offence of obstructing or annoying passengers in the public street. If during the same transaction any individual is affected, he is not deprived of his personal right to proceed separately against the person offending. The offence against public peace is distinct from the offence against a particular individual committed in the same transaction and governed by section 403 (2), Criminal P. C. I am, therefore, of opinion that the acquittal under Section 56, Mysore Police. Act is no bar for a trial under Section 355, penal Code on the private complaint.
( 5 ) IN the circumstances, the Magistrate is correct in having overruled the objection; this petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed.