2007 Supreme(Kar) 518
Karnataka High Court
Judges : A.C.KABBIN
ANITHA VAZ - Appellant
Versus
M.RANGAPPA - Respondent
RFA 450 Of 2000
Decided On : 08/16/2007
Advocates Appeared :
A.RAM MOHAN, K.V.SHIVAPRASAD, Syed Imam Ali
Headnote:Agreements - Agreement of sale - Specific performance of - Sale by Kartha - How to be dealt with in absence of proof of legal necessity. See, Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Cases Referred: AIR 1990 SC 854; JT 2000 (7) SC 483; AIR 1992 pat 40; AIR 1967 SC 574; AIR 1986 SC 79; AIR 1954 SC 379; AIR 1986 SCC 1753.
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 20 - Specific performance - Sale of joint family property - Legal necessity - Purchaser not proving - Two situations - Sellers share ascertainable and not ascertainable - How to deal with. [A. C. Kabbin, J.]: Where the agreement of sale of a family property made by the karta of the family is challenged by the members of the family on the ground of want of legal necessity and the prospective purchaser is not able to establish the legal necessity, the agreement is enforceable to the extent of share of the contracting party in the family property. In that event, if that share is ascertainable, the decree that can be passed would be in respect of the sare of the seller in the property and the purchaser may be asked to apply for partition and get the share demarcated. There may be cases where the members of the sellers family object to the specific performance sought for, but for want of requisite particulars like the properties owned by the family or where the right of the member of the sellers family is not certain, the Court may not be in a position to determine whether the claimants have a share in the property. Where Court finds that the agreement entered into by the plaintiff for purchase of the property is bonafide, but is not certain about the claim of the objector, it would be oppressive to grant partial decree and ask the purchaser to institute a suit for partition to carve out the share of the seller. In such cases, if the plaintiff is already in possession of the property or has been put in possession of the property in part performance of the contract, it will be appropriate to meet the ends of justice to grant decree for specific performance of the agreement as a whole directing that the sale shall be subject to the decision in any subsequent suit for partition in the family. In that event, the alienation in furtherance of specific performance has to be considered as sale of the right of the seller as may be determined in the subsequent suit.
Cases Referred: AIR 1990 SC 854; JT 2000 (7) SC 483; AIR 1992 pat 40; AIR 1967 SC 574; AIR 1986 SC 79; AIR 1954 SC 379; AIR 1986 SCC 1753.
( 1 ) BY judgment dated 27. 11. 1999 passed by the learned XI addl. City Civil Judge, Bangalore in O. S. No. 92/1994, the appellant's (the plaintiff's) suit for specific performance of the contract has been partly decreed directing the respondent No. 1 (the defendant No. 1)to execute the deed for the sale of joint share of the defendant No. 1 in the suit property. Praying for a decree for grant of relief for the sale of the whole of the property as per agreement, the plaintiff has preferred this appeal.
( 2 ) THE suit property (i. e. schedule 'a') is H. No. 39/9, Marappa line, Bazar Street, Neelasandra, Bangalore consisting of land and building thereon totally measuring east to west 40 feet, north to south 153/4 feet. Admittedly, the plaintiff was residing in the said premises as the tenant paying rent to the defendant No. 1's elder brother M. Rangaiah; and later to the defendant No. 1, after Rangaiah's death. It is the claim of the plaintiff that the defendant No. 1 offered to sell the said property, i. e. , the property described in Schedule "a" to her for a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) to discharge certain debts and after receiving an advance of Rs. 70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand) executed an agreement on 15-02-1993 in this regard. Execution of the agreement and receipt of advance of rupees seventy thousand - cash of Rs. 15,000/- and cheque for Rs. 55,000/- have been admitted by the defendant No. 1 in the written statement. The sale was agreed to be completed before the end of December 1993. It is alleged by the plaintiff that despite repeated requests and notice by her to the defendant No. 1, the latter did not execute the sale deed, but instead he got a legal notice issued through the advocate for the defendant No. 3 (defendant No. 1's son) making false and frivolous claim to wriggle out of the contract. It is further alleged by the plaintiff that subsequently the defendant No. 1 set up his mother (the defendant no. 4) laying claim of an interest in schedule 'a' property. Alleging that the 1st defendant had sold other properties adjacent to the suit property as the sole and absolute owner of the properties, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant No. 1 was bound to execute the sale deed as per agreement. It was further alleged by the plaintiff that the first, third and fourth defendants, in collusion with the second defendant forcibly entered one room situated at the rear portion of 'a' schedule property and dispossessed her from the portion of that room. The description of that room has been given in 'b' schedule to the plaint. The plaintiff therefore sought for a decree for specific performance of the agreement of sale after receiving balance consideration and delivery of vacant possession of ' B' schedule property. She also prayed for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with her possession of 'a' schedule property.
( 3 ) THE defendants 1 and 2 filed a common written statement. While admitting the possession of 'a' schedule property by the plaintiff as tenant and payment of rent by her to M. Rangaiah and later to the defendant No. 1, they admitted the agreement and receipt of advance amount by the defendant No. 1. It was contended that since the property was that of the joint family consisting of five members, the defendant No. 1 had no authority to execute the sale deed and therefore the plaintiff was entitled only to the refund of advance amount. As regards the claim of the plaintiff about forcible eviction from 'b' schedule property, it was simply denied.
( 4 ) THE defendant No. 3 (defendant No. 1's son) and defendant no. 4 (defendant no. 1's mother) filed a common written statement. Though they admitted the possession of 'a' schedule property by the plaintiff as tenant, they denied the claim of the plaintiff that possession was in furtherance of part performance of the agreement for sale. They claimed that they along with the defendant No. 1 and other member