The inherent jurisdiction of the Civil Court to grant temporary injunction in appropriate cases is not restricted by specific provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.

( 1 ) THIS petition has come before us on a reference made by the learned Single Judge to consider the following questions of law: 1. Whether the defendants can file an application seeking temporary injunction against the plaintiffs in a suit filed by the plaintiffs? and

( 2 ) WHETHER the decision of this Court in SUGANDA BAI v. SULU BAI AND ORS. [1975 (1) klj 96] 1975 (1) KLJ 96 places any restriction in the matter of grant of temporary injunction in favour of defendants in a suit filed by the plaintiffs? 2. Petitioners were defendants and the respondents were plaintiffs in the trial Court. For the sake of convenience the parties will be referred to by their status in the Court below.

( 3 ) THE brief facts, leading to this reference are as follows: the plaintiffs filed a suit in O. S. No. 19 of 1980 on the file of the Civil Judge at Chikkaballapur, claiming partition and separate possession of their two-thirds share in the plaint schedule properties which are alleged to be the Joint family properties of the plaintiffs and the defendants. In the said suit, the defendants filed an interlocutory application (. A. V), seeking temporary injunction to restrain the plaintiffs from interfering with their possession of certain items of the plaint schedule properties, which according to the defendants had fallen to their share in an earlier partition of the family properties in the year 1953 and that they were in exclusive possession of the same since then. It is further pleaded that taking advantage of the suit the plaintiffs were attempting to interfere with their (defendants) possession and enjoyment of the said properties. 3. 1. The plaintiffs contested the said application, contending, inter alia, that they were entitled to joint enjoyment with the defendants of the properties mentioned in the schedule to the application (. A. V), as the same was still undivided and hence the defendants are not entitled to the relief claimed by them in the application. 3. 2. On consideration of the pleadings and other material on record, the learned trial Judge allowed the defendant's application and granted the temporary injunction in their favour. 3. 3. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiffs preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No. 6 of 1981 on the file of the District Judge at Kolar. By his order dated 15-10-1984 the learned District Judge, allowed the plaintiff's appeal and set aside the order on. A. V. made by the trial Court on the ground that the cause of action alleged in the defendant's application (. A. V) was different from the original cause of action on which the plaintiffs had filed the suit. In reaching the said conclusion the Appellate Court placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in Suganda Bai v. Salu Bai and ors. . It is the validity of that order that is challenged in this revision petition.

( 4 ) THE learned Single Judge is of the opinion that the principle laid down in Suganda Bai's case (supra) restricting the power of a Court to grant temporary injunction, at the instance of a defendant in a suit, cannot be contemplated in view of the wide inherent power of the Court under Section 151 of the CPC, in circumstances not covered by Order XXXIX of the Code. We are entirely in agreement with the view of the learned Single Judge. For this proposition the learned Single Judge relied upon the Ruling of the Supreme Court in MANOHARLAL chopra v. RAI BAHADUR RAO RAJA SETH HIRALAL , AIR1962 sc 527 , [1962 ]supp1 SCR450 dealing with the power of the Court to issue interim injunction under circumstances not covered by Order XXXIX of the Code. Referring to the conflicting views of various High Courts, it has observed thus: "we are of the opinion that the latter view is correct and that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order XXXIX C. P. C. There is no such expression in Section 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a tempor