The court upheld the validity of the rule prescribing an age limit for promotion as Deputy Superintendent of Police and found it to be in compliance with Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

( 1 ) THE petitioner, who is a Circle Inspector of Police, challenges in this writ petition, under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the validity of the rule in the Mysore Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1965, prescribing that for being promoted as a Deputy Superintendent of Police from the cadre of Circle Inspectors, the officer concerned should not have completed 52 years at the time the question of his promotion comes up for consideration. Further he seeks a writ of mandamus from this Court to respondent 1, directing it to promote him as Deputy Superintendent of Police from the date his immediate junior was promoted to that post.

( 2 ) PRIOR to 1 November, 1956, the petitioner was serving in the former State of Coorg. As a result of the Reorganization of States, he was allotted to the new State of Mysore. In his parent State, there was no age restriction in the matter of promotion of an Inspector of Police as a Deputy superintendent of Police. After Reorganization of States, the new State of Mysore promulgated, under Art. 309 of the Constitution, the Mysore Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1960. Under those rules, no Inspector of Police could be promoted as Deputy Superintendent of Police, if by the time he could be promoted he had completed the age of 52 years. The validity of this rule came up for consideration by this Court in C. K. Appanna v. State of Mysore [ (1964) 1 Mys. L. J. 217]. This Court struck down the rule in question on the ground that the rule is invalid as the state Government had not obtained the previous sanction of the Central Government as required by Sub-clause (7) of S. 115 of the States Reorganization Act, 1956, for promulgating that rule. Aggrieved by that decision the State Government applied to this Court for a certificate under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. This Court refused to grant the certificate prayed for. The special leave for appeal prayed for by the State Government was refused by the Supreme Court. Thereafter the State Government promulgated fresh rules under Art. 309 of the Constitution, on 31 March, 1965. In the new rules also there is a provision identical to that which was struck down in C. K. Appanna case [ (1964) 1 Mys. L. J. 217] (vide supra ). The question for consideration is whether that rule can be held to be valid. If that rule is struck down, then, necessarily the petitioner is entitled to be promoted as a Deputy Superintendent of Police with effect from the date his immediate junior was promoted as the only ground on which the promotion was refused to him was that on the relevant date he had completed the age of 52 years.

( 3 ) IT was urged by Sri Datar, the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the decision of this Court in C. K. Appanna case [ (1964) 1 Mys. L. J. 217] (vide supra), the ratio of which applies to the facts of the present case as well, and as no sanction of the Central Government had been obtained even after the decision in C. K. Appanna case [ (1964) 1 Mys. L. J. 217] (vide supra), the rule in question is liable to be struck down. If the authority of the decision in C. K. Appanna case [ (1964) 1 Mys. L. J. 217] (vide supra) had remained unshaken, there would have been no difficulty in accepting the contention of Sri Datar. After the decision in C. K. Appanna case [ (1964) 1 Mys. L. J. 217] (vide supra) the validity of a rule similar to that considered in C. K. Appanna case [ (1964) 1 Mys. L. J. 217] (vide supra) came up for consideration before the supreme Court in N. Raghavendra Rao v. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara AIR1965 SC 136 , (1964 )2 Myslj~ (NULL ), [1964 ]7 SCR549. In that case the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the previous sanction required under S. 115 (7) of the States Reorganization Act must be deemed to have been accorded in view of the memorandum addressed by the Central Government to the State Government on 11 May, 1957. The Supreme Court interpreted that memorandum as according previous