Back
2007 Supreme(Kar) 652
2008(2) Kar. L.J. 35 (DB)
CHIDANANDA ULLAL AND H.N. NAGAMOHAN DAS, JJ.
RANGAPPA (DEAD) BY IDS L.Rs – Appellant
Versus
Smt. CHANNAMMA AND OTHERS – Respondents
Regular First Appeal No. 260 of 1994 connected with Regular First Appeal No. 444 of 1999.
Decided on 03-10-2007
Sri A. Nagarajappa, Advocate for Appellants in R.F.A. No. 260 of 1994
Sri V. Rangaramu, Advocate for Appellants in R.F.A. No. 444 of 1999 and for Respondents 3(a) to 3(f) in R.F.A. No. 260 of 1994
Sri T.R. Narayana, Advocate for Respondent-1 in R.F.A. No. 444 of 1999
Sri P.S. Manjunath, Advocate for Respondents 3 and 4 in R.F.A. No. 444 of 1999 and for Respondents - 6 and 7 in R.F.A. No. 260 of 1994
The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement to prove adoption under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and the devolution of shares in ancestral properties.
Headnote:
Adoption - Hindu Succession Act - Sections 5 to 17 - The court discussed the relevant provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and the capacity of male and female Hindus to take in adoption. It emphasized that the performance of 'Dattaka Homa' is not essential to the validity of adoption, and adoption can be valid even in the absence of proof of 'Dattaka Homa'. The court held that the defendant failed to prove the adoption of plaintiff 3 and that plaintiff 3 is entitled to a share in the schedule properties. The court also discussed the ancestral properties of the common propositor and the devolution of shares upon his demise.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiffs filed a suit for partition of ancestral properties, claiming their entitlement to a share. The Trial Court held that plaintiff 3 and defendant 1 succeeded to the schedule properties as coparceners and passed a judgment and decree declaring the shares of the plaintiffs and defendants.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the defendant failed to prove the adoption of plaintiff 3 and that plaintiff 3 is not entitled to a share in the schedule properties. It also found that the schedule properties are ancestral and discussed the devolution of shares upon the demise of the common propositor.
Issues: The issues included the proof of joint family membership, entitlement to shares, relinquishment of rights, adverse possession, and the binding nature of acquisition proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the failure to prove the adoption of plaintiff 3, the ancestral nature of the schedule properties, and the devolution of shares upon the demise of the common propositor.
Final Decision: R.F.A. No. 260 of 1994 was allowed, R.F.A. No. 444 of 1999 was dismissed, the impugned judgment and decree were set aside, and the suit was decreed in part, declaring the shares of the plaintiffs and defendants.
(H.N. Nagamohan Das, J.) - These two appeals arise out of the judgment and decree dated 23-9-1993 in O.S. No. 75 of 1990 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge at Mysore, decreeing the suit for partition.
2. Appellant in R.F.A. No. 260 of 1994 is the 1st defendant and respondents 1 to 4 are the plaintiffs and respondents 5 to 7 are defendants 2 to 4 before the Trial Court. Appellant in R.F.A. No. 444 of 1999 is the 3rd plaintiff and the respondents are the plaintiffs 1, 2 and 4 and defendants before the Trial Court. In this judgment, the parties are referred to their status before the Trial Court.
3. Plaintiffs contend that common propositor, Lakkaiah, died leaving behind his wife, three daughters and two sons as his legal representatives to succeed to his estate the schedule properties. Plaintiff 1 is the wife, plaintiffs 2, 4 and defendant 2 are the daughters. Plaintiff 3 and defendant 1 are the sons of deceased Lakkaiah. The 1st defendant refused to partition and divide the schedule properties and to put the plaintiffs in separate possession of their respective share and therefore they filed O.S. No. 75 of 1990 for partition.
4. Defendants entered appearance before the Trial Court. Defendant 1 is the contesting defendant and filed written statement inter alia contending that plaintiff 3 was given in adoption to their uncle by name, Rangegowda and therefore he ceased to be the coparcener of joint family of the 1st defendant. On the demise of propositor, Lakkaiah, the 1st defendant is the only sole surviving coparcener and succeeded to the schedule properties and therefore he contends that plaintiffs are not entitled for share in the schedule properties. The 1st defendant further contends that the 1st plaintiff, the wife of common propositor, Lakkaiah, took her share by way of cash and jewellary and separated from the joint family. He further contends that some of the schedule properties are acquired by defendants 3 and 4 and they are not available for partition.
5. On the basis of pleadings, Trial Court framed the following eight issues.-
"(1) Whether plaintiffs prove that they along with defendants 1 and 2 are members of joint family and suit schedule properties are their joint family properties?
(2) Whether 1st defendant proves that he became the sole surviving coparcener after the death of his father and became the absolute owner of the entire properties as contended in para 1 of his written statement?
(3) Whether plaintiffs prove that plaintiffs 1, 2 and 4 are entitled to 1/8th share each and 3rd plaintiff is entitled to 7/18th share in the suit schedule properties?
(4) Whether the 1st defendant proves that 1st plaintiff relinquished all her rights in the plaint schedule properties as contended in para 1 of his written statement?
(5) Whether 1st defendant proves that the claim of the plaintiffs, if any, has been barred by principles of adverse possession as contended in para 1 of his written statement?
(6) Whether plaintiffs prove that acquisition proceedings initiated by the 3rd and 4th defendants do not bind their share and share of the 2nd defendant as contended in para 8 of their plaint?
(7) Whether plaintiffs are entitled for partition by metes and bounds and separate possession of their share as claimed?
(8) To what relief plaintiffs are entitled?"
6. Plaintiffs examined two witnesses as P.Ws. 1 and 2 and got marked Exs. P. 1 and P. 2. Defendants examined two witnesses as D.Ws. 1 and 2 and got marked Exs. D. 1 to D. 3. Trial Court after hearing both the parties and on appreciation of the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence on record concludes that the defendants have failed to prove and establish that plaintiff 3 was given in adoption to his uncle, Rangegowda. Trial Court further held that on the demise of common propositor, Lakkaiah, plaintiff 3 and defendant 1 succeeded to the schedule properties as coparceners. On a notional partition, Trial Court allotted 1/3rd share each to the propositor, Lakkaiah, pla
