VIKRAMAJIT SEN, AG.C.J.

1. This Appeal has been preferred by the State of Karnataka against the order of learned Single Judge who has issue a prerogative writ directing that the age of retirement of all Professors/Teachers in all Colleges in the State of Karnataka regardless of whether they are serving in Central Universities or Educational Institutions directly funding by the Central Government/University Grants Commission should be increased to 65 years.

2. A piquant situation has been arisen because two conflicting judgments has been passed by two co-ordinate Single Benches of this Court. The earlier decision emanates from the Circuit Bench at Gulbarga, rejecting the prayer for passing appropriate directions to the State and its Universities and Colleges increasing the age of retirement/superannuation of Professors and Teachers up to the date on which they attain the age of 65 years. The impugned Order which arrives at a diametrically and incompatibly opposite conclusion, has been passed by the learned Single Judge of the Principal Bench at Bangalore.

3. As is to be expected, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the Appellants, has contended that the later judgment is per incuriam and calls to be set aside merely on this short ground. Per contra learned Senior Counsel for the respondents before us have submitted that the proceedings were initiated earliest in point of time in the Principal Bench where arguments were heard in detail, protracted over several days, and hence it is the Circuit Bench that ought to have abjured to hear the writ petitions which came to be subsequently filed also in Gulbarga. If binding precedents even of co-ordinate strength are not followed, the roots of uncertainty of the law are bound to be nurtured, strengthened are proliferated. Although spoken in a totally different context, we are reminded of the opening stanza of the poem “The Second Coming’ authored by William Butler Yeats. The lines obviously do not advert to the principle of stare decisis but they are apposite in bringing out the wisdom of this ancient and venerable principle.

“Turning and turning in the widening gyre

The falcon cannot hear the falconer;

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;

Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world”.

4. We are of the opinion that the impugned judgment, in as much as it runs contrary to an earlier judgment of a co-ordinate Bench is liable to be set aside on this consideration alone. In paragraph 4.9 of the impugned judgment, a reference to the circuit Bench decision finds mention. Therefore, the passing of the impugned judgment, even in the somewhat unique circumstances that the learned Single Judge found himself placed in, should have been avoided. Honouring the strong views to the contrary, the matter should have been referred to a larger Bench.

5. The situation before us has become more confounded owning to the disposal by a Division Bench of an Appeal filed against the Circuit Bench decision, the one which is anterior in time to be impugned order. The immediate question that would arise is whether we are bound to traverse the same path as our co-ordinate Bench did in its Judgment dated 06.09.2011 (W.A.Nos.10095-10096/2011). We have carefully cogitated on this conundrum and having done so it seems to us that because of the obtaining circumstances we are not bound by the pronouncement of the co-ordinate Bench. This is for the reason that the verdict is predicated on a concession recorded before the Division Bench by the learned counsel for the State. As is to be expected in such a situation, our learned Brothers therefore did not consider it necessary to ponder on the myriad complexities which have manifested themselves in the present litigation. We find ourselves in agreement with the submission of the learned Additional Advocate General to the effect that the judgment of the Division Bench being sub silentio is therefore not binding on us. With the greatest respect to o