Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

2. The facts are as follows:

The first respondent herein has filed a suit for declaration, possession and mandatory injunction against respondents 2 to 6 herein. It is claimed that he is the owner of the suit schedule property which has been illegally occupied by respondent no.6, who has put up certain construction therein and hence the suit.

The petitioner was not a party to the suit. On learning of the pendency of the same, he had filed an application to implead himself as a party. It is the petitioner’s case that one Nanjappa was the owner of the property. He was the father of respondents 2 to 4 herein and the husband of respondent no.5. It is claimed that the said Nanjappa had parted with the possession of the suit property for a consideration but, as there was a statutory bar under the provisions of the Karnataka Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act 1966, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity), to execute a sale deed – secondary documents, such as a power of attorney to enable the transferee to hold the property and an affidavit to fortify the transfer, were said to have been executed as on 5.11.1988 in favour of one Krishnappa, who in turn, similarly transferred the same property in favour of one Hemalatha on 4.1.1989. The aforesaid Act was repealed with effect from 29.11.2000. The said Hemalatha had thereafter executed a registered sale deed in favour of one Madhukar. This was said to have been ratified by the aforesaid Krishnappa. Madhukar is said to have obtained a sanction of plan from the competent authority and had constructed a house and thereafter had sold the suit property to the petitioner under a registered sale deed dated 22.11.2006. The petitioner claims that he was in possession thereof.

In the year 2008, according to the petitioner, respondent no. 1 is said to have informed that his suit in respect of the property was to be decreed soon and that he should make preparations to vacate the property-this has prompted the petitioner to approach the trail court with an application to implead himself. That application was summarily rejected. The petitioner had then approached this court challenging that order. This court having set aside the order had directed the trail court to rehear the application. The trail court having again dismissed the application holding that the petitioner’s sale deed was in violation of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the TP Act’ for brevity) and hence would have no right to participate in the proceedings, the present petition is filed.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the trail court has failed to take into account the several exceptions, that have been recognized by a plethora of authorities-to the rule enunciated in Section 52 of the TP Act.

That the trail court has brushed aside the several transactions in respect of the suit property, much prior to the suit, commencing with the transfer of the possession of the property by the father of respondents 2 to 4 in the year 1988. And hence the alleged transfer in favour of respondent No.1 by respondents 2 to 4 was not tenable as the property could no longer be claimed by them.

The further glaring circumstance that respondent 2 to 4 were consenting witness to the said deed in favour of the petitioner’s vendor, namely the sixth respondent, dated 13.3.2002 and therefore the same respondents having executed a sale deed on 16.3.2002 was apparently a fraudulent mischief which the trail court has completely glossed over.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a large number of authorities to sustain the writ petition.

4. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, seek to sustain the impugned order and would contend that the blatant violation of Section 52 of the TP Act, is apparent from the plaintiff’s own narration of the events and ther