2012 Supreme(Kar) 307
High Court of Karnataka
VIKRAMAJIT SEN & B.V. NAGARATHNA
M. Ramu
Versus
The Assistant Commissioner & Others
Writ Appeal Nos.2373-2379 of 2012, 2546-2555 of 2012(LR)
Decided on : 04-06-2012
For the Appellant:Padmanabha Mehale, Sr. Advocate, Naveed Ahamed, Advocate.
For the Respondents:R2 to R8 -R. Padmanabha, R1 -B. Veerappa, AGA, R2 -H. Basavaraju, R20, S.J. Puranik, Advocates.
Headnote:KARNATAKA LAND REFORMS ACT, 1962 - Section 48-A: [Vikramjit Sen, Chief Justice & B.V. Nagarathna, JJ] Claim for occupancy rights - Land was converted for non-agricultural purposes and the Respondents who purchased parcels of land from legal successors., have built residential houses - Tribunal did not consider the fact that the property was assessed to tax by B.B.M.P. and the taxes are being paid by the assessees from time to time - Single Judge set aside the order of Tribunal - Order Single Judge was affirmed.
Vikramajit Sen, C.J.
1. These Appeals assail the Order dated 12.04.2012, passed by the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition and quashing the impugned order of the Land Tribunal Bangalore North Taluk (Tribunal for short) dated 7.02.2006.
2. Late Gujjarappa had purchased agricultural land in Survey No.221 measuring 39 guntas situated at Doddigunta village, Kasaba hobli, Bangalore North Taluk and had granted a lease in favour of M.Ramu, the Appellant before us. The Appellant claims that the lease in question was agricultural in character, whereas it is contended by the Respondents that only a portion of a house thereon had been given on rent to the Appellant. On 26.12.1974, the Appellant filed an application in Form No.7 under Section 48A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act before the Tribunal, claiming occupancy rights, which came to be allowed on 23.03.1989. This Order was assailed by way of Writ Petition No.15773/1991 by the legal heirs of the original owner, late Gujjarappa and it was allowed on 5.07.1996 remanding the matter back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration and determination. In the second salvo of litigation, the Tribunal noted the stance of the legal heirs of late Gujjarappa, inter alia, that the Applicant/Appellant was merely staying in one of the houses situated in the property in question. A perusal of the said Order dated 07.02.2006 discloses that it was founded entirely on the basis of revenue records i.e., the Record of Rights (RTC) for the year 1966-67 to 1975-76 containing the name of the Appellant in column No.12(2) followed by the name of late Gujjarappa. However, the impugned Order does not disclose any discussion vis-à-vis the owner’s version that the land stood converted from agricultural to non-agricultural user viz., for residential user. The Occupancy rights were granted in favour of the Appellant. Thereupon, several writ petitions came to be filed which have been allowed by the impugned Order dated 12.04.2012. Incidentally, a further hearing was granted to Appellant/Respondent No.2 in W.P.No.99/2007 on the day following the hearing of arguments and pronouncement of decision, the appellant herein had appointed Senior Counsel for the purposes. The Writ Court noted the arguments addressed on behalf of the respondent – (a) There was no conversion order, (b) Conversion must be under Section 93 of the Mysore Land Revenue Code, (c) Land remains to be agricultural land even if it is not used for agricultural purposes, (d) No Power of Attorney was given by the Appellant/Tenant authorizing the sale of the property and (e) Question of tenancy has to be decided by the Land Tribunal and not by the Court. Even in the second hearing granted to the Appellant, the Writ Court stood steadfast to its earlier conclusion to the effect that the Order of the Land Tribunal passed on 07.02.2006 deserved to be quashed.
3. The first question which has been pithily discussed by the learned Single Judge was that the Power of Attorney had been duly executed by the Appellant and was legally efficacious to sell/transfer his rights to third parties. Since the Appellant had sold all his rights in the land, he no longer possessed locus-standi to agitate any question, claim or any rights to the land. It is significant to note that the person to whom the Appellant had sold the land have evinced no interest in the present litigation even though the fruits thereof would enure to them and not to the Appellant. Having conveyed all his rights in the land to third parties, the present litigation can only be viewed as a device of extortion, or harassment or blackmail aimed at the present bona fide purchasers from the landlord or his legal representatives. Having so noted, the writ Court need not have proceeded further in the matter since exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is purely discretionary.
4. Be that as it may, so far as the other questions are concerned, it was incumben