The main legal point established in the judgment is that the validity of the remand order and the criteria for granting occupancy rights under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act were central to the Court's decision.

1. The appellants before us have assailed the order of remand dated 15-6-1999 passed by the learned Single Judge while disposing of Writ Petition Nos. 18961 and 24667 of 1998. The original petitioners, who are the appellants before us, are admittedly the landowners of a small piece of land which measures hardly 15 guntas. Though it is technically described as being located in Kalkamba Village, effectively the area is now included within Belgaum City and the principal point of dispute centers around the question as to whether occupancy rights could have at all been granted in respect of this small piece of land which has been more particularly described as a backyard, the reason being that it is the case of the landowners that the land has been converted to non-agricultural use as early as 31-10-1963. The original applicant, since deceased and now represented by his legal representatives - respondents 2 to 12, had applied for grant of occupancy rights in respect of this piece of land, the contention being that it is agricultural land, that there are mango trees located on it, and that the applicant was in possession and was, therefore, eligible for grant of occupancy rights. His contention was also that he was cultivating the land, which has been disputed by the owners. But, in any event, there are several litigations between the parties, some of which are still pending. After the first round of litigation before the Tribunal, the case was remanded for fresh decision and on the next occasion, after a vigorous contest, the Tribunal, through a detailed speaking order through a majority 4 to 1 decision, granted occupancy rights. It is relevant to mention here that the Chairman, who was a Government Officer, has given detailed reasons in the order which are effectively to the effect that the land in question having been converted for non-agricultural use in the year 1963, that it cannot qualify as agricultural land on the appointed date i.e., 1-10-1973, and that consequently, the Tribunal was not competent to grant occupancy rights since the first ingredient viz., requirement that the land in question should be agricultural land, was not in existence. The remaining four members, however, dissented with the Chairman and recorded the finding that occupancy rights should be granted and it is against this order that the writ, petitions in question were preferred. We need to mention here that the order is a rather mixed up one, because there is some reference in the order attributable to the majority members, who also referred to the fact that it is non-agricultural land, to conclude with the finding "However, in our opinion, the occupancy rights are liable to be granted". As indicated by us earlier, it is this order that was the subject-matter of challenge before the learned Single Judge, who after hearing the learned Advocates, recorded the finding that if the members, even though by majority, overruled the findings of the Chairman and assuming that they are entitled in law to do so, that they must support their conclusions and decisions through proper reasons and in the absence of any reason, the majority decision is virtually relegated to the position of a non-speaking order and it is on this ground that the order was set aside and the learned Single Judge directed a remand. The present appeals assail the validity of the remand order.

2. We need to refer here at the very outset that appeal Courts seldom entertain challenges to remand orders, but, that the appeal Bench has more than once laid down, as has been done by us some time back, that there are instances when a remand is totally and completely unjustified and in those few cases, the appeal Court may be required to intervene. We have had occasion to refer to the submissions canvassed by the learned Government Pleader, who did point out to us in every one of these cases that the moment some technical flaw is pointed out with regard to the Tribunal's order, that a remand i