2013 Supreme(Kar) 906

High Court of Karnataka
H. BILLAPPA, J.
S.V. Narayanaswamy
Versus
Savithramma & Others
R.F.A.No.1163 of 2002 c/w R.F.A.No.1164 of 2002
Decided on : 02-09-2013

Headnote:POWERS OF ATTORNEY ACT, 1882 - Revocation: [H. Billappa, J] Power of Attorney coupled with interest - All the rights and liabilities under the contract were made over to the Attorney - Oral agreement of sale executed by the vendor - Delivery of possession of property to the buyer in part performance of agreement to sell - Subsequent irrevocable GPA executed by the vendor in favour of purchaser assigning various rights including to put up construction - Clause relating to irrevocable is introduced in the Power of Attorney - Held, Such Power of Attorney coupled with interest and is regarded as property disposition/transfer of property rather than as the conferring of general authorities on the attorney. - Further Held, it is clear from the terms of GPA, the appellant has been authorized to put up construction, to obtain license, to pay tax, to apply for necessary permits, to get cement, steel etc., to enter into an agreement or agreements to lease out, to realize rent, to manage, supervise and direct construction, to pay after construction house tax, light and water charges, to attend repairs or alteration, and to defend all actions. Clause No.15 of the GPA provides that the executed i.e., ’X’ shall not revoke the GPA until such time that his attorney voluntarily seeks for such revocation. It is clear that, the GPA cannot be revoked until such time the appellant seeks for its revocation. Therefore, it cannot be said that the GPA was given only for the purpose of putting up construction. The GPA authorises the appellant to enter into agreement, to lease out the property, to attend to repairs and alteration, to pay tax and other charges after construction. The GPA cannot be revoked until such time the appellant voluntarily seeks for its revocation. Therefore, the contention of the respondents that the GPA was given only for the purpose of construction cannot be accepted.

       SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963 - Sections 16 & 20: [H. Billappa, J] Suit for specific performance of oral agreement of sale - Payment of full sale consideration amount in cheque and cash - Delivery of possession in part performance of agreement - Documents were handed over pursuant to the sale agreement - Plaintiff/Appellant obtained licence and sanctioned plan for the construction - Plaintiff/Appellant was authorized under the irrevocable General Power of Attorney to put up construction, to obtain licence, to pay taxes, to obtain necessary permissions form the authorities concerned - General Power of Attorney executed coupled with interest - Pleadings are in conformity with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act - No specific denial of the plaint averments as required under Order 8 Rules 3 and 5 of C.P.C. - Evidence on record to show the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract throughout the process of transaction - Dismissal of suit by the Trial Court without exercising judicious direction under Section 20 of the Act - Grant of decree of permanent injunction in favour of defendant - Appeal against - Held, Trial Court erred in dismissing the suit. Plaintiff/Appellant is entitled for specific performance of oral agreement of sale agreement. The pleadings are in conformity with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and Form Nos. 47 and 48 of 1st Schedule to CPC. The pleadings and evidence of the respondents themselves show that the appellant was demanding, insisting and pressurizing the respondents to execute the sale deed after the death of ’X’ and the respondents/LRs of late ’X’ have declined to execute the sale deed. The documents produced by the appellant clearly show that the appellant has spent considerable amount to put up construction, they have not produced anything to show that deceased ’X’ had put up construction or spent money. In fact, ’X’ has executed power of attorney Ex.D1 and has orally agreed to sell the suit schedule property in favour of the appellant. The documents produced by the appellant clearly show that the appellant has put up construction and he is in possession. The construction has come up upto the lintel level. At that stage, the respondents have approached the Court and obtained injunction. There is nothing on record to show that deceased ’X’ or the respondents have put up construction or spent money. The Trial Court was not justified in granting injunction in favour of the respondents. Mere price escalation during the pendency of the litigation is not a ground to deny specific performance. The Court can impose reasonable condition to pay additional amount which is reasonable. In the present case, the litigation has gone on for years. In the circumstances of case, and keeping in view the price escalation, it is proper to direct the appellant to pay additional amount of Rs. 20,00,000/- in addition to the amount already paid. The appellant is entitled for specific performance, but subject to the condition that the appellant shall pay additional amount of Rs. 20,00,000/- to the respondents.