The demand for the loan amount is considered as a demand for the cheque amount when the cheques were issued to repay the loan amount, and a specific demand for the payment of the cheque amount is necessary in the notice issued under Section 138(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

N. Ananda, J.

1. There are concurrent findings of the courts below that petitioner (accused) has committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The law is fairly well settled that revisional court does not act as a court of second appeal. The revisional court can interfere with the impugned judgment if the courts below have committed glaring discrepancies in appreciation of evidence resulting in manifest injustice to petitioner.

2. Sri. P.V. Gunjal, learned counsel for petitioner has raised following contentions:

i). That legal notice caused by petitioner is not in accordance with Section 138(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

ii) The Secretary of complainant society did not have locus-standi to present the complaint.

3. The learned counsel for respondent would justify the impugned judgment.

4. Sri. P.V. Gunjal, learned counsel for petitioner/accused has relied on the judgment of Supreme Court reported in 2007 (4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 973 : 2007 (6) R.A.J. 223 : Cri. A 525/2005 dated 02.11.2007 (in the case of M/s. Rahul Builders v. M/s. Arihant Fertilizers & Chemical & Another) to contend that, what should be demanded in the notice is the cheque amount and nothing else. If the cheque amount is not demanded in the notice, such a notice cannot be construed as one falling within the ambit of Section 138(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

In the aforestated judgment, the Supreme Court has held.

"12. On this aspect of the matter, we may consider K.R. Indira v. Dr. G. Adinarayana, (2003 (4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 966 : (2003) 8 SCC 300) : (AIR 2003 SC 4689) wherein this Court upon noticing Suman Sethi (supra) stated the law, thus:

"....However, according to the respondent, the notice in question is not separable in that way and that there was no specific demand made for payment of the amount covered by the cheque. We have perused the contents of the notice.

Significantly, not only the cheque amounts were different from the alleged loan amounts but the demand was made not of the cheque amounts but only the loan amount as though it is a demand for the loan amount and not the demand for payment of the cheque amount, nor could it be said that it was a demand for payment of the cheque amount and in addition thereto made further demands as well. What is necessary is making of a demand for the amount covered by the bounced cheque which is conspicuously absent in the notice issued in this case. The notice in question is imperfect in this case not because it had any further or additional claims as well but it did not specifically contain any demand for the payment of the cheque amount, the non-compliance with such a demand only being the incriminating circumstance which exposes the drawer for being proceeded against under Section 138 of the Act.

5. In the case on hand, the complainant had caused a notice stating that, cheques issued by the petitioner/accused for a sum ofRs. 5,00,000/- dated 17.05.2003 and another cheque for a sum of Rs. 6,06,000/- dated 24.05.2003 were dishonored, the aggregate amount, of dishonored cheques is a sum of Rs. 11,06,000/-. Therefore, complainant caused legal notice dated 18.08.2003 and demanded to repay the said amount along with interest in all a sum of Rs. 11,46,794/-. It is also stated in the notice that petitioner had harassed the complainant by issuing bogus cheques without there being any intention on the part of accused to pay the amount. Therefore, he had caused the notice to return a sum of Rs. 11,46,794/- within 15 days from the date of receipt of notice.

6. In the first paragraph of notice it is stated that, petitioner being the proprietor of Shree Padmavati Automobiles, Gokak, had availed loan amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- from the complainant society on 02.11.2001 agreeing to pay interest at 17% per annum and in order to repay the loan amount, petitioner had issued the aforestated cheques. The loan amount is nothing but the cheque amount and vice versa.

7. The accused due to