2015 Supreme(Kar) 293
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
R.B. BUDIHAL, J.
Girija Patel – Appellant
Versus
Vijay R Rao – Respondent
Criminal Revision Petition No. 1062 of 2014
Decided On : 10-02-2015
For the Petitioner:Pramila Nesargi, Sr. Counsel a/w Rama Ramachandra Iyer for M/s. Legal Solutions, Advocates.
For the Respondent:Annapoorna Bevinje, Advocate.
The main legal point established in the judgment is that under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the interim custody of a child can only be granted to the aggrieved person or the person acting on her behalf, and the respondent-husband does not have the right to seek interim custody.
Headnote:
Custody - Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Sections 2(a), 12, 18, 21, 23, 25, 28, 36 - The court discussed the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, particularly focusing on the definition of 'aggrieved person' and the scope of custody orders under Section 21. The court emphasized that the interim custody of a child can be granted to the aggrieved person or the person acting on her behalf, and highlighted the lack of provision for the respondent-husband to seek interim custody. The court also considered the jurisdictional aspect and the impact of international orders on the custody decision.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner-wife sought revision of the order granting interim custody of the child to the respondent-husband under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The respondent-husband had obtained custody of the child from the Superior Court of California, and the petitioner-wife challenged this decision.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the order granting interim custody to the respondent-husband was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act and was void ab initio. The court emphasized that the respondent-husband did not have the right to seek interim custody under the Act, and the international orders did not validate his claim.
Issues: The key issues were the jurisdictional aspect of the custody decision, the interpretation of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and the impact of international orders on the custody dispute.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the Act, particularly focusing on the definition of 'aggrieved person' and the scope of custody orders under Section 21. The court emphasized that the interim custody of a child can be granted to the aggrieved person or the person acting on her behalf, and highlighted the lack of provision for the respondent-husband to seek interim custody.
Final Decision: The court allowed the revision petition and set aside the orders granting interim custody to the respondent-husband.
1. The petitioner-wife, being aggrieved by order dated 22.12.2014 passed by the Fast Track Court - V at Bengaluru in Criminal Appeal No.1335/2014 confirming the order dated 1.12.2014 passed in Crl. Misc.No.28/2012 on I.A. by the Metropolitan Magistrate Traffic Court-VI, Bengaluru City, prefers the above revision petition against the respondent- husband on the grounds that:
The impugned judgment and order are contrary to law, procedure and materials on record. Under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short 'the PWDV Act'), the Magistrate is not vested with the power of granting custody to the respondent. The Sessions Court ought not to have passed the impugned order as welfare of the child is at paramount consideration. It has not appreciated the fact that the child was abducted by the respondent and that he had kept the child away from the petitioner for over two years and the respondent cannot be allowed to benefit from his own fault. The Superior Court of California has also observed that the respondent kept the child away from the mother intentionally. The Sessions Court ought to have seen that the entire dispute between the parties is regarding the property which has been observed by both the Superior Court of California as well as this Court. It ought to have gone into the merits of the case before talking to the child as the Magistrate-in-charge who interviewed the child was not aware of the case and its intricacies and did so only because a memo to the effect was filed against the respondent. The Sessions Court has not considered the fact that the child is a girl nearing the age of puberty and that she has to be with her mother for proper care during this period. The Sessions Court has failed to appreciate that the respondent has psychological problems, for which he was being treated, which fact has been admitted by him before the Superior Court of California. The Sessions Court has not looked into the fact that the child is happy in the school and the surroundings and also happily celebrated the petitioner's birth day recently. Enquiry ought to have been conducted by the Sessions Court and it ought to have spoken to both the parties to evaluate the parents before passing the impugned order. The impugned order is passed without considering evidence, citations and the documents produced by the petitioner. The Sessions Court ought to have seen that if the relief claimed in the interim application is the same as claimed in the final relief, then no relief ought to be granted without any enquiry or trial. The sessions Court, not being conversant with the facts and merits of the case and not being sensitized about the matter, has not posed the right questions to find out the actual mind of the child and it has also failed to appreciate that the child has been in the custody of the respondent, who has poisoned the mind of the child, but the petitioner never spoken ill about the respondent to the child only saying that she will understand the scenario once she grows up. The Sessions Court has also grossly erred in not taking into consideration the fact that this Court has set aside the order passed by the Magistrate. Hence, sought to allow the revision petition.
2. Heard the arguments of the learned senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioner-wife and learned counsel appearing for the respondent-husband.
3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner-wife, while arguing the matter, drew the attention of this Court to the provisions under Sections 2(a), 12, 18, 21, 23, 25, 28 and 36 of the PWDV Act and submitted that under the provisions of the said Act, it is the aggrieved person alone can apply for the reliefs and not any other person. The petitioner wife is the aggrieved person and hence, she is competent to apply for the relief seeking custody of the child. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that after coming back from abroad, the petitioner wife wa