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2010 Supreme(Kar) 1224

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
Aravind Kumar, J.
S.M. Suparies —Appellant
Vs.
Karnataka Bank Ltd. —Respondent
Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 2827 of 2003
Decided on : 27-08-2010

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
Mr. G. Venkatachala, for the Appellant
Mr. K.V. Shyama Prasad, for the Respondent

Headnote:ARBITRATION & CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 - Sections 2(e) & 42: [Aravid Kumar,J] Word ’Court’ - Held, When two Sections namely Section 2(e) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Section 14 of the Karnataka Civil Courts Act are read in conjunction it would mean "Principal District Judge" of that particular District would be the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of its jurisdiction which would be entitled to decide the questions forming the subject matter of Arbitration. Hence, to import into words Principal Civil Court to mean and include the Principal Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) would be otiose for two reasons - (a) Unlike in section 2(c) of 1940, Act where the word "District" is used same does not find a place in 1996, Act and (b) While reading the exclusion clause in comparison of two enactments namely 1940, Act and 1996, Act the marked difference which is to be found is that in 1940 Act only the Court of Small Causes were excluded whereas under 1996 Act any Court inferior to such Principal Civil Court is also included for the purposed of exclusion. Thus, Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District would mean an include only the Principal District Judge of the District and no the Principal Civil Court (Sr.Dn.) or any other Court having original jurisdiction which is inferior in grade to such "Principal Civil Court".

       KARNATAKA CIVIL COURTS ACT, 1964 - Section 14: [Aravid Kumar,J] Word ’Court’ - Held, When two Sections namely Section 2(e) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Section 14 of the Karnataka Civil Courts Act are read in conjunction it would mean "Principal District Judge" of that particular District would be the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of its jurisdiction which would be entitled to decide the questions forming the subject matter of Arbitration. Hence, to import into words Principal Civil Court to mean and include the Principal Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) would be otiose for two reasons - (a) Unlike in section 2(c) of 1940, Act where the word "District" is used same does not find a place in 1996, Act and (b) While reading the exclusion clause in comparison of two enactments namely 1940, Act and 1996, Act the marked difference which is to be found is that in 1940 Act only the Court of Small Causes were excluded whereas under 1996 Act any Court inferior to such Principal Civil Court is also included for the purposed of exclusion. Thus, Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District would mean an include only the Principal District Judge of the District and no the Principal Civil Court (Sr.Dn.) or any other Court having original jurisdiction which is inferior in grade to such "Principal Civil Court".

JUDGMENT

Aravind Kumar, J.—This appeal by the 1st judgment Debtor is against an order passed on I. A. No. I in Execution Case No. 17/2000 by the Principal District Judge, Shimoga, dated 16-12-2002.

2. On 31-7-1999, an award came to be passed by the arbitrator and in order to have the fruits of the award, claimant filed an execution petition in Ex. Case No. 17/2000 before the Principal District Judge, Shimoga. The Registry of the office of the District Jude, Shimoga, raised an office objection under two grounds:

(i) Under Section 2(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 "Court" means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District and as such execution petition was not maintainable.

(ii) Further, under Section 42, it is clearly stated that where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.

3. On raising these queries, Registry noted that Principal District Judge, Shimoga, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the execution petition and accordingly, it was posted before the Court. By order dated 14-11-2000, the Principal District Judge kept open the point regarding jurisdiction and ordered notice on judgment debtors. On service of notice judgment Debtors 1 and 2 have appeared and contested the execution petition.

4. On 9-8-2001, Principal District Judge has issued sale notice, pursuant to which, two properties were sold at spot. Court auction/ sale was conducted on 3-8-2002.

5. On 19-10-2002, an application came to be filed under Order 21, Rule 90 of Code of Code of Civil Procedure by the 1st judgment debtor represented by its proprietrix, who is also the wife of the 2nd judgment debtor to set aside the sale contending there were certain irregularities in the sale. The said application came to be resisted by the decree-holder. Trial Court after considering rival contentions, by its order dated 16-12-2002 dismissed the application, which order is assailed in this appeal.

6. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties.

7. Sri. Venkatachala learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant first J. Dr. would contend that Principal District Judge did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the execution petition and the objection raised by the office ought to have been upheld in view of Section 2(e) read with, Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. He would submit that execution petition ought to have been rejected or ought to have been returned for being presented before the Court having jurisdiction. He would elaborate his submission by contending that reading of Section 2(e) would clearly establish that Court having jurisdiction to entertain a suit of original jurisdiction would be the Court which would be entitled to consider and adjudicate an application filed by the claimant for execution of a decree. He would further contend that in the instant case execution petition ought to have been filed before Principal Civil Judge, (Sr. Dn.) Shimoga since the said Court has the jurisdiction to try a original suit of this nature. In support of his submission he relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. Annapurna Construction, AIR 2008 SC 2028 and also the judgment of the Delhi High Court reported in Virendra Saigal Vs. Sumatilal Jamnalal, AIR 1970 Delhi 14 and seeks for allowing of the appeal and setting aside the order passed by the executing Court.

8. Per contra Sri. K. V. Shyamaprasad learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent decree holder would support the order passed by the executing Court and contends by reading of Section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 it would emerge that it is the Principal Civil Court of the District which has jurisdiction to try execution petition and when it is read











































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