The Public Premises Act prevails over general rent control laws and does not require a bona fide need to be established for eviction orders.

Hari Nath Tilhari, J.—By this petition, the Petitioner has challenged the order impugned dated 24th of June, 1999, passed by the 1st Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, in Appeal No. 410 of 1984, Electric Power Devices Co. Canara Mutual Building v. Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, whereby, the 1st Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, has dismissed the Petitioner's appeal from the order dated 15.12.1984, passed by Estate Officer in case No. 1 of 1984.

2. The facts of the case in the nutshell are; that:

On proceedings being taken under Sections 4 and 5, of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, against the Petitioner from the premises in question situated at 2nd floor of Canara Mutual Buildings, at No. 4, Residency Road, Bangalore, on the ground that the petitioner's lease has been terminated or determined vide notice of termination dated 11.1.1983, and as, the Petitioner before this Court did not comply with the notice, so, the proceedings, as his continuing in possession after termination of tenancy was unauthorised one. Notice of the petition, which was moved by the Divisional Manager of LIC, was issued and served on the present Petitioner, who was Respondent before the Estate Officer. The present Petitioner filed his reply before the Estate Officer and raised the following pleas. That the Respondent, before the Estate Officer, has been in possession of the premises, as a tenant since 1955, and he cannot be deemed to be an unauthorised occupant. That the present petition is barred by res judicata, since earlier petition had been dismissed, vide order dated 29.3.1982, and no appeal had been preferred, therefrom. That the area occupied is 464 square ft. in Second Floor, and there is no bona fide requirement of the space by Life Insurance Corporation of India, when an area of approximately three times were let out to post office on the ground floor, and it was stated in defence that, it speaks about the mala fide intention of LIC. The present Petitioner, who was Respondent before the Estate Officer, also took the plea, that, he will be subject to great hardship, if he is evicted therefrom.

3. The Estate Officer framed the following points for determination:

1. Whether the Respondent before it is in unauthorised occupation of the public premises in question.

2. Whether the present action taken to evict Respondent as bonafide and the premises is required for self-occupation by LIC of India for expansion of its Branch Office, as contended by LIC?

3. Whether the present action initiated against the Respondent (that is, Respondent before the Estate Officer), is barred by principles of res judicata as contended by the Respondent?

4. To what reliefs, if any?

On consideration of the material on record, the Estate Officer, held that, it is not a disputed question, that, premises in question is public premises within the meaning of Public Premises Act, so, the position was that, it was an admitted position, that, the premises in question has been a public premises within the framework of public Premises of Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants' Act. He further found, that, tenancy had been terminated validly, and as the premises in question is a public premises in terms of the Act, so the Respondent (present Petitioner) was held to be in unauthorised occupation of the premises, since after, determination of tenancy. It further held, that the Respondent before the Estate Officer, that is, present Writ Petitioner did not make out and could not make out a case, that the action of the LIC, was mala fide. It also held, that, previous action was, on account of default in payment of rent, so, that decision will not, operate as, res judicata.

4. On appeal being preferred by the present Petitioner, the learned Appellate Court, held that, there is no dispute, that, the premises is a public premises and by a valid notice, a tenancy has been validly terminated, the Appellate Court opined, in th